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ABSTRACT 
 Following many recent intentional mass casualty incidents (MCIs), bystanders have 
come to the rescue, helping those around them. These active bystanders, known as 
immediate responders, have saved lives by providing immediate care for life-threatening 
injuries, evacuating victims, and transporting the injured to hospitals. However, immediate 
responders also tend to overwhelm the closest hospital and inaccurately prioritize victims 
for treatment. Emergency responders must manage this emergent response to leverage the 
benefits of the extra help but to avoid unintended consequences. A literature review and 
analysis of recent MCIs reveals that existing planning assumptions do not account for 
bystander help; this thesis recommends a new paradigm for MCI management that takes 
into account the complexity of MCIs, including immediate responder emergence, and 
includes suggestions for training incident commanders to operate in these novel and 
complex environments. The thesis also provides recommendations for encouraging 
bystanders to become immediate responders by creating a helping culture, which can 
include providing community training and bolstering laws to protect Good Samaritans. 
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Mass casualty emergency response plans are predicated on a number of 
assumptions, most of which were developed many decades ago. One assumption is that 
victims and bystanders will rely solely on emergency medical services to get to the scene, 
take control of the response, provide initial treatment, and transport victims to hospitals. In 
this sense, response plans expect bystanders to be the typical, passive definition of the term: 
“A person who is present at an event of incident but does not take part.”1 
Many recent mass casualty incidents (MCIs) have been intentional, caused by an 
antagonist targeting a large group with violence to cause mass injuries and deaths. During 
those events, bystanders have been active on the scene by helping those around them, 
becoming what has been coined active bystanders or immediate responders.2 Faced with 
both shocking injuries and the terror of a violent attack, many victims and immediate 
responders—mindful of the risk of further violence—are more inclined to treat one another 
and leave the area of the attack long before emergency medical services can arrive.3  
While public safety agencies have acknowledged the actions of immediate 
responders following an intentional MCI, there remains little research guiding best use of 
these bystanders as a response resource. As the frequency, magnitude, and severity of 
intentional MCIs have increased, the role and ubiquity of the immediate responder has 
become more apparent. While extra helping hands may make a meaningful difference in 
terms of lives saved, professional responders must manage this emergent response to avoid 
unintended consequences. The incident management constructs, many of which can be 
traced to the civil defense era, have resulted in suboptimal responses when applied to these 
 
1 Lexico, s.v.“bystander,” accessed June 4, 2020, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/bystander. 
2 Isaac Ashkenazi and Richard C. Hunt, “You’re It—You’ve Got to Save Someone: Immediate 
Responders, Not Bystanders,” Frontiers in Public Health, December 5, 2019, https://doi.org/10.3389/
fpubh.2019.00361. 
3 Erik Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning,” Annals of Emergency 
Medicine 47, no. 1 (January 2006): 34–49, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annemergmed.2005.05.009. 
xviii 
new circumstances. This thesis explores how response agencies can adapt policies, plans, 
and procedures to account for and encourage bystanders to become immediate responders.  
Recent MCIs, particularly those caused by acts of violence, have featured 
immediate responder action that affected the response. After-action reports, media reports, 
and literature have shown undesirable side effects because existing policies and procedures 
did not account for immediate responder participation. The thesis examines case studies of 
MCIs and immediate responder behavior. The research also reviews the applicable policies, 
procedures, and approaches of emergency response agencies, and how such models have 
impacted the response outcome. The evidence shows the scale and scope of the problem 
and reveals the unintended consequences of immediate responder action. The thesis also 
discusses stereotypes about expected bystander response to determine if they are valid. The 
sociological theories and constructs that apply to MCI management and bystander behavior 
are then applied to inform alternative approaches to optimize immediate responder action.  
Throughout this analysis, the thesis reviews a sample of five domestic and 
international intentional incidents since 2000: the 2001 World Trade Center attack, the 
2004 Madrid train bombings, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, the 2016 Pulse 
Nightclub shooting, and the 2017 Las Vegas Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting. These 
events were chosen because they had a systemic impact on the health care system due to 
the quality of the incident or quantity of patients, and featured pronounced immediate 
responder action. The cause of the incidents, the nature of the scenes and injuries, and the 
response, with an emphasis on immediate responder activity following the event, are 
examined. Specifically, the research investigates the positive and negative outcomes of 
immediate responder emergence, and the analysis identifies patterns and correlations in 
incident conditions and immediate responder actions. 
After-action reports, literature, and media coverage show that outdated MCI 
approaches cause less severely injured victims to transport themselves first, overwhelming 
xix 
the closest hospital.4 Hospitals often misperceive this first wave of patients as 
representative of all injuries when, in reality, far more severe patients remain on the scene.5 
Bystanders also fail to use additional surrounding hospitals or specialty centers, which are 
designed for the traumatic injuries common in these events. Emergency medical services 
resources converge on the scene, not knowing that their services may be better used to 
redistribute patients already transported by immediate responders.6 These findings expose 
misconceptions about bystanders and helping behavior that have contributed to this 
resource being discounted in emergency planning. The research herein challenges 
assumptions related to disaster syndrome, panic, and social breakdown that have prevented 
response plans from incorporating bystanders. In contrast to these myths, the thesis shows 
that immediate responders exhibit a sociological construct known as emergence following 
an MCI, and that they can be leveraged as part of a response plan. 
Incident commanders currently struggle, however, to manage emergent immediate 
responders. Many of the structures used by public safety organizations for incident 
management are derived from military applications, which use a hierarchical command-
and-control model to identify clear objectives, lines of authority, and divisions of labor. 
These constructs drive routine emergency response and are effective for managing small-
scale incidents. However, the Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), which are routinely used by these commanders, are 
inadequate during large MCIs, especially those with immediate responder emergence. 
Successful leadership will require a diversion from the traditional applications, requiring 
commanders to adopt a method that takes into account the complexity and uncertainty. 
 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report: Las Vegas Shooting 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=814668; 
Annelie Holgersson, “Review of On-scene Management of Mass-Casualty Attacks,” Journal of Human 
Security 12, no. 1 (2016): 91–111, http://doi.org/10.12924/johs2016.12010091; Auf der Heide, “The 
Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning.” 
5 Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning.” 
6 Alejandro López Carresi, “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings: An Analysis of Pre-hospital 
Management,” Disasters 32, no. 1 (2008): 41–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2007.01026.x; M. G. 
Guttenberg, A. Asaeda, and A. Cherson, “Utilization of Ambulance Resources at the World Trade Center: 
Implications for Disaster Planning,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 40, no. 92 (2002). 
xx 
These MCIs call for a new paradigm for approaching incident management—one that 
incorporates sensemaking, probing, analysis, responsiveness, and agility. 
This thesis considers two concepts that may provide a more effective means of 
managing today’s complex MCIs: operating at the edge of chaos and leadership through 
the Cynefin framework. This sensemaking framework allows the incident commander to 
understand the environment, recognizing that each of the elements of the system of MCI 
response may be in its own domain of complexity. Based on the findings of the 
sensemaking, incident commanders can allow emergent groups to function organically 
while orchestrating other aspects of the response, such as professional rescuer assignments. 
This model of management more closely aligns with the complex environment, thereby 
allowing for more effective incident leadership and advancement toward a resolution. 
The thesis also proposes development for the person or team that manages 
immediate responders at an intentional MCI, proposing new skills that will allow the 
incident commander to think through the complex environment and guide resources toward 
resolution. Recognizing the benefits of immediate responder action, as well as the need to 
mitigate unintended consequences, the thesis examines means to develop a culture of 
helping behavior. Finally, recommendations for leveraging immediate responders to 
provide the best possible outcome for victims of, and responders to, intentional MCIs are 
provided. These include pre- and post-incident approaches. The recommendations are: 
• Using public safety assets at hospitals 
• Reconfiguring incident management processes to coincide with the unique 
demands of this type of event 
• Developing the incident commander to be able to analyze work in a novel, 
complex environment to effectively manage the incident 




• Bolstering and standardizing Good Samaritan laws 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Mass casualty emergency response plans are predicated on a number of 
assumptions, most of which were developed many decades ago. One such assumption is 
that victims and bystanders will rely solely on emergency medical services to get to the 
scene, take control of the response, provide initial treatment, and transport victims to 
hospitals. In this sense, response plans expect bystanders to fill the typical, passive 
definition of the term: “A person who is present at an event of incident but does not take 
part.”1 
Many recent mass casualty incidents (MCIs) have been intentional, caused by an 
antagonist targeting a large group with violence to cause mass injuries and deaths. During 
these events, bystanders have been active on the scene by helping those around them, 
becoming what has been coined active bystanders or immediate responders.2 Faced with 
both shocking injuries and the terror of a violent attack, many victims and immediate 
responders—mindful of the risk of further violence—are more inclined to treat one another 
and leave the area of the attack long before emergency medical services can arrive.3 While 
the actions of immediate responders following an intentional MCI have been 
acknowledged, there remains little research guiding best use of this asset as a response 
resource. As the frequency, magnitude, and severity of these intentional MCIs have 
increased, the role and ubiquity of the immediate responder has become more apparent. 
While extra helping hands may make meaningful differences in terms of lives saved, 
professional emergency responders must manage this emergent response to avoid the 
unintended consequences that have resulted during recent events. The incident 
 
1 Lexico, s.v.“bystander,” accessed June 4, 2020, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/bystander. 
2 Isaac Ashkenazi and Richard C. Hunt, “You’re It—You’ve Got to Save Someone: Immediate 
Responders, Not Bystanders,” Frontiers in Public Health, December 5, 2019, https://doi.org/10.3389/
fpubh.2019.00361. 
3 Erik Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning,” Annals of Emergency 
Medicine 47, no. 1 (January 2006): 34–49, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annemergmed.2005.05.009. 
2 
management constructs that first responders follow, many of which can be traced to the 
civil defense era, have resulted in suboptimal responses when applied to these new 
circumstances. 
After-action reports, literature, and media coverage of numerous noteworthy 
incidents have shown that the outdated MCI approaches manifest in practical implications 
for patients and the health care system. Less severely injured victims tend to transport 
themselves first, overwhelming the closest hospital.4 Hospital personnel often misperceive 
this first wave of patients with minor injuries as representative of all casualties when, in 
reality, far more severe patients remain on the scene.5 When patients transport themselves 
to the closest hospital, they fail to use additional surrounding hospitals or specialty centers, 
which are specially designed for the traumatic injuries that are common in these events. 
Emergency medical services (EMS) resources converge on the scene, not knowing that 
their services may be better used to redistribute patients already transported by immediate 
responders.6 This thesis explores how response agencies’ plans, policies, and procedures 
can best leverage immediate responders to meet the unique demands of a violent MCI. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bystander response to mass casualty incidents has changed in recent years—or 
perhaps the impressions that first responders have of bystanders have simply shifted. The 
purpose of this literature review is to explore the evolution of bystander behavior following 
an emergency. The review traces explanations for why many researchers once asserted that 
bystanders were unwilling to help, but now play a major role in disaster response during 
mass casualty events, becoming immediate responders.  
 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report: Las Vegas Shooting 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=814668; 
Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning.” 
5 Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning.” 
6 Alejandro López Carresi, “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings: An Analysis of Pre-hospital 
Management,” Disasters 32, no. 1 (2008): 41–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2007.01026.x M. G. 
Guttenberg, A. Asaeda, and A. Cherson, “Utilization of Ambulance Resources at the World Trade Center: 
Implications for Disaster Planning,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 40, no. 92 (2002). 
3 
Social psychologists began studying bystander behavior in the 1960s. The early 
work was prompted by the murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City, where it was 
reported that thirty-eight people witnessed the crime but did not intervene.7 Though this 
case of a single murder differs from an MCI, this early research contributed to the 
assumption that bystanders would not help in an emergency of any scale. John Darley and 
Bibb Latane concluded that bystanders fail to provide assistance when they are part of a 
larger group of bystanders, a phenomenon coined the bystander effect.8 They attribute 
bystanders’ inaction to the diffusion of responsibility—the presence of other bystanders 
reduces the responsibility each person feels—or pluralistic ignorance—the presence of 
others, especially those who react calmly, makes bystanders believe the event is not an 
emergency.9 Later, Latane and Darley added a third factor, evaluative apprehension—the 
fear of public judgment for intervening dissuades bystanders from acting.10  
Based on Latane and Darley’s findings, group dynamics, specifically the behavioral 
and psychological changes that occur when others are present, help explain why bystanders 
fail to act. In the following years, researchers continued to observe the same bystander 
inaction in a variety of settings.11 Latane and Steve Nida found that as group size increases, 
helping behaviors decrease.12 Shalom Schwartz and Geraldine Clausen tested various 
 
7 Arthur J. Lurigio, “Crime Narratives, Dramatizations, and the Legacy of the Kitty Genovese Murder: 
A Half Century of Half Truths,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 42, no. 7 (July 2015): 782–89, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854814562954. 
8 Bibb Latane and John M. Darley, “Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10, no. 3 (November 1968): 215–21, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/h0026570. 
9 Bibb Latane and John M. Darley, “Bystander ‘Apathy,’” American Scientist 57, no. 2 (1969): 244–
68. 
10 Latane and Darley. 
11 Ruud Hortensius and Beatrice de Gelder, “From Empathy to Apathy: The Bystander Effect 
Revisited,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 27, no. 4 (2018): 249–256, https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0963721417749653. 
12 Bibb Latane and Steve Nida, “Ten Years of Research on Group Size and Helping,” Psychological 
Bulletin 89, no. 2 (March 1981): 308–24, http://search.proquest.com/docview/63552441?rfr_id=info% 
3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. 
4 
group sizes and compositions, all of which revealed bystanders failing to act.13 Victor 
Harris and Carol Robinson hypothesized that bystanders are more inclined to help when 
confronted with a critical event, but they found the same bystander inaction in serious 
incidents, including acute asthma attacks and epileptic seizures.14 Even in noncritical 
events, such as when pencils spill to the ground, bystanders fail to help, as shown by Latane 
and James Dabbs.15 The studies show that when in groups, bystanders consistently fail to 
act when presented with a person in distress. 
Researchers initially thought that lone bystanders would be more likely to help if 
no group was present, attributing bystander inaction to the diffusion of responsibility, 
pluralistic ignorance, and evaluative apprehension.16 Without other bystanders present, 
researchers believed lone bystanders may be more inclined to act. However, in Latane and 
Darley’s 1968 study, 25 percent of lone bystanders failed to act when simulated smoke was 
pumped into the room to suggest a nearby fire.17 Likewise, Judith Rodin found that 30 
percent of single bystanders did not help a victim who had fallen.18 These studies 
consistently found that bystanders would not come to the aid of those in need, whether they 
were alone or in a group, but did not explain why. 
Social psychologists began to hypothesize that bystanders’ understanding of an 
event exerts the most influence on their response. Differing from many earlier studies, 
Irving Piliavin, Rodin, and Jane Piliavin found that sixty-two of sixty-five sick subjects 
 
13 Shalom H. Schwartz and Geraldine T. Clausen, “Responsibility, Norms, and Helping in an 
Emergency,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16, no. 2 (October 1970): 299–310, 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0029842. 
14 Victor A. Harris and Carol E. Robinson, “Bystander Intervention: Group Size and Victim Status,” 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 2, no. 1 (July 1973): 8–10, https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03327696. 
15 Bibb Latane and James M. Dabbs, “Sex, Group Size and Helping in Three Cities,” Sociometry 38, 
no. 2 (June 1975): 180, https://doi.org/10.2307/2786599. 
16 Peter Fischer et al., “The Bystander-Effect: A Meta-analytic Review on Bystander Intervention in 
Dangerous and Non-dangerous Emergencies,” Psychological Bulletin 137, no. 4 (July 2011): 517–37, 
http://doi.org/10.1037/a0023304; Russell D. Clark and Larry E. Word, “Where Is the Apathetic Bystander? 
Situational Characteristics of the Emergency,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29, no. 3 
(March 1974): 279–87, http://doi.org/10.1037/h0036000. 
17 Latane and Darley, “Bystander ‘Apathy.’” 
18 Latane and Darley. 
5 
received help.19 Likewise, Russell Clark and Larry Word demonstrated that 100 percent 
of bystanders, whether in a group or alone, helped when presented with an emergency.20 
In both cases there was a clear emergency with an obvious victim and a critical need for 
action. These studies suggest that it is not group dynamics, as previously suggested, but 
rather the presence of ambiguity that dissuades bystanders from acting. If bystanders 
merely overhear an accident or do not otherwise see a victim, they often misinterpret the 
seriousness of the emergency, thereby stifling action.21 Bystanders act when they are 
confident that an emergency has occurred.22 When bystanders are less certain of the 
situation, they often look to other bystanders for direction, leading to bystanders providing 
delayed help or no help at all.23 This literature shows that a bystander who has a clear 
understanding of the situation is more likely to help. 
Further probes of bystander motivations have explored the risk-benefit analysis of 
potential helpers. By helping someone, a bystander might experience a range of outcomes, 
from embarrassment to death. The nonresponsive bystanders in Bruce Denner’s 
experiment reported that because they were unsure whether they had witnessed a crime, 
they were embarrassed to report it.24 Further supporting this risk analysis concept, Piliavin 
and Piliavin showed that victims are less likely to be helped if they are covered in blood, 
undermining the ambiguity argument but suggesting an aversion to higher risk.25 In 
Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin’s experiment, an intoxicated victim who demonstrated the 
 
19 Irving M. Piliavin, Judith Rodin, and Jane A. Piliavin, “Good Samaritanism: An Underground 
Phenomenon?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 13, no. 4 (December 1969): 289–99, 
http://doi.org/10.1037/h0028433. 
20 Russell D. Clark and Larry E. Word, “Why Don’t Bystanders Help? Because of Ambiguity?” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 24, no. 3 (December 1972): 392–400, http://doi.org/10.1037/
h0033717. 
21 Clark and Word, “Where Is the Apathetic Bystander?” 
22 Bruce Denner, “Did a Crime Occur? Should I Inform Anyone? A Study of Deception,” Journal of 
Personality 36, no. 3 (1968): 454–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1968.tb01485.x. 
23 Clark and Word, “Where Is the Apathetic Bystander?” 
24 Denner, “Did a Crime Occur?” 
25 Jane Allyn Piliavin and Irving M. Piliavin, “Effect of Blood on Reactions to a Victim,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 23, no. 3 (September 1972): 353, http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 
1295929262?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. 
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potential for physical harm was less likely to receive help than someone suffering a cardiac 
emergency.26 Each of these studies supports the concept that bystanders conduct a risk-
benefit analysis, though they may not consciously do so.27 Clark and Word concluded that 
a bystander who feels safe is more likely to help.28 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND DESIGN 
Recent MCIs, particularly those caused by acts of violence, have featured 
immediate responder action that affected the response and caused unintended 
consequences—often because existing emergency response policies and procedures do not 
account for immediate responder participation. This thesis asked the question: How can 
response agencies adapt policies, plans, and procedures to account for and encourage 
bystanders to become immediate responders? To do so, the thesis examined case studies of 
MCIs and immediate responder behavior in five domestic and international incidents since 
2000: the 2001 World Trade Center attack, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 2013 
Boston Marathon bombing, the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting, and the 2017 Las Vegas 
Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting. These events were chosen because they had a systemic 
impact on the health care system due to the quality of the incident or quantity of patients. 
The cause of the incidents, the nature of the scenes and injuries, and the response, with an 
emphasis on immediate responder activity following the event, were examined.  
The thesis also reviewed the applicable policies, procedures, and approaches of 
emergency response agencies, and how such models have impacted the outcome of MCI 
responses. The evidence found in these incident reviews illuminates the scale and scope of 
the problem and shows the unintended consequences of immediate responder action. 
Stereotypes about expected bystander response were examined to determine if they are 
valid. The sociological theories and constructs that apply to MCI management and 
 
26 Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin, “Good Samaritanism.” 
27 Denner, “Did a Crime Occur?”; Piliavin and Piliavin, “Effect of Blood on Reactions to a Victim”; 
Piliavin, Rodin, and Piliavin, “Good Samaritanism.” 
28 Clark and Word, “Where Is the Apathetic Bystander?” 
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bystander behavior were applied to inform alternative approaches to optimize immediate 
responder action.  
To examine the actual incidents, government-issued or -endorsed after-action 
reviews of the MCIs were reviewed, but the reviews have several limitations. First, many 
of the reviews are agency-specific and therefore do not account for the continuum of care 
or the broader systemic impacts. Second, while several of the reports acknowledge 
immediate responder action, they do so superficially and do not provide detailed accounts 
of the behavior or the impacts on the response. Instead, the reports focus on the behavior 
and performance of the public safety personnel. To fill in the gaps, reputable media reports 
and peer-reviewed literature were also used to inform a more comprehensive examination 
of the event and response. Incidents were chosen because they featured a level of 
immediate responder action that impacted the response and outcome throughout the health 
care spectrum, and caused challenges to MCI response plans. The examples are meant to 
illustrate the characteristics of immediate responder action and enumerate its common 
effects. The group of events studied is not exhaustive; it is recognized that events with 
more or less immediate responder action exist and should be studied further in the future. 
Specifically, the research investigated the positive and negative outcomes of 
immediate responder emergence, and the analysis identified patterns and correlations in 
incident conditions and immediate responder actions. The following questions were 
developed to guide the examination and provide consistent analysis: 
• Did the incident feature immediate responder action that had systemic 
impacts on scene and beyond? 
• Was the incident intentional (antagonistic)? 
• Did the immediate responders understand the nature of the incident and 
potential ongoing threats to their safety? 
• Did the event take place in an urban, suburban, or rural area? 
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• Did immediate responders intervene in the aftermath of the incident? In 
what ways did they do so? 
• What were the positive outcomes of the immediate responder action? 
• What were the negative outcomes of the immediate responder action? 
• How did the immediate responders demonstrate the concepts of 
emergence and other sociological constructs? 
• Did the response agencies’ policies foster the helping behavior provided 
by immediate responders and allow for management thereof? 
Emphasis was placed on analyzing the positive and negative impacts of the 
immediate responder action seen in the MCI case studies and literature. The current 
response paradigm and incident management approach was examined to determine its 
suitability for promoting and managing immediate responder action. Based on these 
analyses, the thesis provides policy recommendations for creating a helping culture, 
managing immediate responders, and developing more effective MCI response plans. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The chapters that follow explore how bystanders become immediate responders at 
scenes of violent MCIs, and in what ways their action impacts MCI response, including 
challenges of, and recommendations for, managing bystanders as a resource. Chapter II 
compares existing planning assumptions to the actual conditions of intentional MCIs, 
demonstrating the discord between plans and reality. It describes the existing planning 
assumptions that inform the current response model to MCIs and examines the unique 
characteristics of the modern MCI, including those incidents brought about intentionally. 
The chapter describes how bystanders have typically behaved, challenging many of the 
existing planning assumptions, and examines the exclusion of immediate responders in 
response plans. 
Chapter III explores some of misconceptions about bystanders and helping 
behavior, which have likely contributed to their underutilization as a resource in emergency 
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planning. The chapter challenges assumptions of disaster syndrome, panic, and social 
breakdown. In contrast to these myths, the concept of emergence is introduced as a 
sociological construct exhibited by immediate responders following an MCI. 
Chapter IV examines the impacts of immediate responder behavior following an 
MCI. The positive outcomes, such as life-saving care and transportation to hospitals, are 
recounted. Negative outcomes, such as misdirected efforts, poor distribution of patients to 
hospitals, and failure to notify hospitals in advance, are also explored. 
Chapter V examines the current model of command and control used for MCI 
management. The circumstances and conditions of modern, antagonistic MCIs, including 
immediate responder action, are shown to be incompatible with this traditional approach. 
The chapter considers two concepts that may provide a more effective means of managing 
these complex events: operating at the edge of chaos and leadership through the Cynefin 
framework. 
Chapter VI then considers how to develop the person or team that manages 
immediate responders at an intentional MCI. It shows that the current Incident Command 
System (ICS) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) that are routinely used 
by these commanders are inadequate during these events. The chapter proposes new skills 
that will allow the incident commander to think through the complex environment and 
guide resources toward resolution. 
Recognizing the benefits of immediate responder action, as well as the need to 
mitigate unintended consequences, Chapter VII examines how to develop a culture of 
helping behavior. The chapter uses public cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) outreach 
and training that has been conducted over the past fifty years as an example of engaging 
the public. It also describes Good Samaritan laws, which protect immediate responders 
from litigation. Finally, the chapter discusses the type of training and approach that is 
necessary to encourage this behavior. 
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II. NEW MCIS: CHALLENGING PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS 
AND TRADITIONAL APPROACHES  
The public safety and health care response to MCIs is led by an emergency response 
plan, which is based upon planning assumptions. These conventional beliefs assert that 
specific circumstances, conditions, and responses can be expected. Using these supposedly 
predictable elements, plans guide responders to achieve the desired outcome of a response 
to an emergency: treating and transporting patients, and regaining control and order. Recent 
events have shown, however, that these planning assumptions are erroneous and, as a 
result, lead to suboptimal management and response. Two elements in particular—
intentional MCIs and immediate responder action—are not accounted for in the current 
plans, which make them challenging to manage. 
A. TRADITIONAL MCI RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS 
The policies in place today for response and management of a mass casualty 
incident (MCI) are not much different than original constructs developed several decades 
ago. They are based on assumptions that victims are isolated and unable to communicate 
with others outside of the scene, that the events are in geographically remote locations and 
confined to a single scene, there is no threat of violence, patients are distributed to health 
care facilities in controlled manner, and emergency medical services are the sole provider 
for treating and transporting patients.29 In the United States, most of the MCIs of the past 
were caused by accidents, such as mass transit crashes, structure failures, weather events, 
and industrial accidents.30 Up until the past few decades, civilians were largely spared the 
intentional MCI. 
The tenets of MCI response and management emphasize controlling the event and 
patients at the scene, then transporting to definitive care. The responsibility for scene 
 
29 Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning,” 3449. 




management lies primarily with EMS, with law enforcement and fire/rescue providing 
ancillary assistance. EMS is to arrive, assess the scene, determine what resources are 
needed, locate and deploy the resources, triage each  patient, provide on-scene care, and 
then transport patients in a manner that distributes them across health care facilities, all 
while maintaining incident command.31 Law enforcement provides scene security, while 
fire/rescue supplies extra manpower to assist with operations. The incident dynamics are 
communicated with area hospitals, who are then given the opportunity to plan for arrival 
of patients already partially treated and managed by EMS professionals. This approach 
requires that patients remain on scene until EMS evaluates, treats, and transports them; that 
there be sufficient resources in a timely manner to affect positive treatment for patients; 
and that the area be of reasonable geographic scope to control it as a single incident. The 
approach assumes that bystanders and victims cannot or will not take action in response, 
and professional rescue is necessary to mitigate the incident. 
B. NEW MCI CONDITIONS 
The world has evolved a great deal since MCI response paradigms were 
conceptualized. Now most victims can communicate immediately with their cellphones; 
violence now often causes the MCIs; more MCIs, particularly those caused by violence, 
tend to happen in densely-populated areas; simultaneous intentional acts of violence can 
spread resources across a large geographic area; patients self-transport; EMS is often 
bypassed by patients themselves or empowered immediate responders; and patients are not 
evenly distributed among hospitals.32 Many of these changes can be attributed to the 
causes and nature of recent MCIs. 
While the threat of traditional accidents still exists, many MCIs today are caused 
by acts of violence, such as mass shootings, improvised explosions, mass stabbings, vehicle 
 
31 Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange, “Mass Casualty Trauma 
Triage Paradigms and Pitfalls” (report, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, July 2019), 59. 
32 Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning,” 44. 
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rammings, and other similar assault tactics.33 Not only have the methods changed but so 
too have the impacts. The violent incidents are occurring more frequently and involve far 
more victims due to the choice and power of weapons.34 The injury patterns, especially 
those associated with gunshots and explosives, have become more devastating and far more 
time-sensitive than conventional traumatic injuries, such as those caused by blunt trauma. 
Faced with both shocking injuries and the terror of a violent attack itself, while mindful of 
the propensity for additional attacks, victims are more inclined to leave the area of the 
attack long before emergency medical services can arrive.35  
While not codified and, in fact, usually ignored in policies and procedures, patients 
now self-transport or are transported by other civilians, they no longer rely on EMS to 
access definitive care, they have means to communicate widely outside of the scene, and 
they are often treated by immediate responders.36 These conditions are not accounted for 
in emergency response plans, and the MCIs usually become more complicated to control, 
especially while attempting to apply outdated methods.37 However, these new conditions 
are providing more patients with faster access to definitive care—presumably saving more 
lives—and are proving that bystanders can and will respond to emergency events, with or 
without professional rescue personnel.38  
 
33 Ronald Simon and Sheldon Teperman, “The World Trade Center Attack: Lessons for Disaster 
Management,” Critical Care 5, no. 6 (November 6, 2001): 318, https://doi.org/10.1186/cc1060; Marie 
Simoneaux, “After Las Vegas Shooting, UMC Gets Advice from Responding Medical Team,” nola.com, 
May 21, 2018, https://www.nola.com/entertainment_life/health_fitness/article_c3eada72-23a1-5752-99fb-
519e72489f19.html. 
34 Derek S. Wheeler and W. Bradley Poss, “Mass Casualty Management in a Changing World,” 
Pediatric Annals; Thorofare 32, no. 2 (February 2003): 99. 
35 K. Tierney, “Project Summary: Disaster Analysis: Delivery of Emergency Medical Services in 
Disasters” (summary, Disaster Research Center, 1993), 190. 
36 Auf der Heide, “The Importance of Evidence-Based Disaster Planning,” 40. 
37 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report, 19.  
38 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 19.  
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C. IMMEDIATE RESPONDER ACTION IN MCIS 
Incidents such as the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack (over 4,000 nonfatally 
injured),39 the World Trade Center attack of 2001 (7,364 nonfatally injured),40 the 2004 
Madrid railway attack (1,180 nonfatally injured),41 the 2005 subway and bus attacks in 
London (775 nonfatally injured),42 and the Las Vegas mass shooting of 2017 (817 
nonfatally injured)43 show just how devastating these events can be and the degree of strain 
they can immediately place on a health care system that operates at near capacity on a daily 
basis. In each of these events, immediate responder action played a major role in the 
response, highlighting the critical role civilians play when the number of patients is too 
overwhelming for the EMS system. The events also reveal challenges associated with an 
unregulated response force. 
While the magnitude of these recent events, combined with heavy media coverage, 
magnified the visibility of immediate responder action, helping behavior by immediate 
responders following disasters is hardly a new occurrence. In 1954, Lewis Killian 
published several articles in the Journal of Social Science in a series entitled “Human 
Behavior in Disaster: A New Field of Social Research.”44 Within this series, sociologists 
explored group formation and membership following disasters, including the driving social 
influences and how those groups impacted society.45 In the introduction to the series, 
 
39 Robyn Pangi, “Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway 
System,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25, no. 6 (2002): 424. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100290101296. 
40 Guttenberg, MG, G. Asaeda, A. Cherson et al. “Utilization of Ambulance Resources at the World 
Trade Center: Implications for Disaster Planning. Annals of Emergency Medicine 40, no 92 (2002). 
41 Carresi, Alejandro López. “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings: An Analysis of Pre-Hospital 
Management.” Disasters 32, no. 1 (2008): 52. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2007.01026.x. 
42 Holgersson, Annelie. “Review of On-Scene Management of Mass-Casualty Attacks.” Journal of 
Human Security; Melbourne 12, no. 1 (2016): 92. https://doi.org//10.12924/johs2016.12010091. 
43 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1 October After-Action Report. Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2018: 10. https://emsfellowship.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/After-
Action-from-Las-Vegas-Shooting.pdf 
44 Lewis M. Killian, An Introduction to Methodological Problems of Field Studies in Disasters 
(Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1956), 8. 
45 Lewis M. Killian, “Some Accomplishments and Some Needs in Disaster Study,” Journal of Social 
Issues 10, no. 3 (1954): 66–72, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1954.tb02000.x. 
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Dwight Chapman states, “Five years ago, it would have been an exaggeration to describe 
‘human behavior under conditions of disaster’ as anything more than an embryonic field 
of research … we can now say, without hyperbole, that this baby has been born.”46 Studies 
soon expanded beyond generalized human behavior and drove toward specific types of 
behavior, such as the action of bystanders following a disaster. 
The convergence of bystanders was heavily studied in the late 1950s by researchers 
associated with the National Opinion Research Center. Charles Fritz and Eli Marks, who 
looked at communities that were highly organized because of repeated exposure to 
disasters, described the behavior as helpful, labeling it as the “therapeutic community.”47 
Later, in 1962, J. Thompson and R.W. Hawkes described the same behavior as the 
“synthetic community,” noting it was manufactured by the disaster, but also called it the 
“mass assault,” highlighting the disadvantages of disorganized, widespread 
convergence.48 In 1969, Allen Barton emphasized the goodwill that comes of collective 
stress by titling it “the altruistic community.”49 James Bentley Taylor, Louis Zurcher, and 
William Key, using  the term “utopian community” in 1970, emphasized that the behavior 
observed during this time was ideal.50 In the five decades since that early work, a great 
deal of research has been conducted to understand bystander behavior following disasters. 
Contemporary mass casualty incidents, such as those explored in this thesis, 
highlight the significant role that immediate responders play in getting victims to safety, 
providing initial medical care, and transporting them to the hospital. These reactions are 
not unusual; helping behavior has been widely reported following natural disasters, transit 
accidents, terrorist attacks, active violence incidents, and fires.  
 
46 Killian, Field Studies in Disasters. 
47 Charles E. Fritz and Eli S. Marks, “The NORC Studies of Human Behavior in Disaster,” Journal of 
Social Issues 10, no. 3 (1954): 26–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1954.tb01996.x. 
48 J. Thompson and R.W. Hawkes, “Disaster, Community Organization and Administrative Process,” 
in Man and Society in Disaster, eds. George W. Baker and Dwight D. Chapman (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1962), 268–300. 
49 Allen Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969). 
50 James Bentley Taylor, Louis A. Zurcher, and William H. Key, Tornado: A Community Responds to 
Disaster (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970). 
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Immediate responders play an integral role in MCI response; by evacuating victims 
and providing immediate life-sustaining care, they provide action during the time-sensitive 
gap between the incident itself and the arrival of professional rescuers. These immediate 
responders also help to offset the profound imbalance between victims and rescue 
resources, a hallmark of MCIs. Immediate responder action is credited with transporting 
most of the injured to hospitals following major events. Despite the benefits of civilian 
engagement, immediate responder intervention introduces challenges, such as poor scene 
control and imbalanced hospital resource allocation. 
D. FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR IMMEDIATE RESPONDER ACTION IN 
MCI PLANNING 
Though immediate responder action immediately following an MCI has been 
recognized for decades, MCI response plans do not account for this resource. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) document Operational Templates and 
Guidance for EMS Mass Incident Deployment, the guiding document upon which local 
emergency response agencies are to base their plans and tactics, does not contain the word 
bystander.51 FEMA’s guiding document for medical response to active violence, Fire/
Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for 
Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents, mentions bystanders three times: once as a 
challenge to the scene, once as a possible hostile threat, and once as an obstruction.52 Of 
thirty-seven U.S. local and state policies and protocols for EMS response to MCIs reviewed 
for this thesis, none included provisions for bystanders to serve as medical responders. The 
disregard for bystanders is further seen in the Emergency Responder, Emergency Medical 
Technician, and Paramedic training curriculum issued by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, the government agency designated to create standardized training 
 
51 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Operational Templates and Guidance for EMS Mass 
Incident Deployment” (guidance document, Department of Homeland Security, June 2012). 
52 U.S. Fire Administration, “Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational 
Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents” (guidance document, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, September 2013). 
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curriculum for EMS personnel.53 Neither the National Emergency Medical Services 
Education Standards nor the Model Uniform Core Criteria for Mass Casualty Incident 
Triage, the standards to which every EMS provider in the United States is trained, includes 
provisions for immediate responder inclusion or management.54 The training, policies, and 
procedures continue to presume that EMS will manage the entirety of the MCI response, 
without any help or intervention from immediate responders. 
On January 24, 2019, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office 
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response convened a roundtable to discuss 
the changing demands of MCIs and how to revise emergency response to best meet these 
new conditions.55 The roundtable included recognized experts and visionary thinkers in 
the fields of emergency medical services, emergency medicine, trauma surgery, emergency 
management, health care emergency response, and combat medicine. Despite observations 
about immediate responder action and the results of this behavior, the group came to only 
“some agreement” on whether hemorrhage control supplies should be provided to 
immediate responders at MCIs, even if they are trained in these skills, because immediate 
responders may not be able to apply the skills as proficiently as EMS personnel.56 The 
group also reached only “some agreement” on the roles of taxis and ride-sharing 
components when discussing the fact that the majority of patients from recent MCIs were 
transported to hospitals without the help of an ambulance.57 Such alternative transportation 
means, they discussed, “can result in over-triage of ambulatory patients to trauma 
centers.”58 There was also only “some agreement” about whether taxi, ride-sharing, and 
 
53 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “National Emergency Medical Services 
Education Standards—Emergency Medical Technician Instructional Guidelines” (guidance document, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2009). 
54 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Model Uniform Core Criteria for Mass Casualty 
Incident Triage: Addendum to the Emergency Medical Technician Instructional Guidelines” (guidance 
document, U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017). 
55 Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange, “Mass Casualty Trauma 
Triage Paradigms and Pitfalls.” 
56 Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange. 
57 Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange. 
58 Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange. 
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mass transit drivers should receive layperson medical training, again citing that perhaps 
these services should not be engaged at all.59 While recognizing that immediate responders 
have played an influential role in MCI management, the group did not propose further 
empowerment or inclusion of immediate responders in the response plan. 
  
 
59 Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange. 
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III. THE SOCIOLOGY OF HELPING BEHAVIOR IN MCIS 
Emergency response plans may ignore immediate responders due to 
misconceptions about how bystanders will perform. The myths suggest that bystanders are 
either unable or unwilling to help and that the disaster evokes behavior in them that is so 
undesirable, the behavior itself becomes a hindrance to emergency response. During 
numerous past experiences, however, bystanders have not behaved this way. Instead, they 
have been willing and able to assist, becoming an emergent group of helpers that brings 
about a faster resolution to the incident. The following section explores common 
misconceptions about bystanders and uses evidence from literature and recent cases to 
show that they are unfounded. 
A. BYSTANDER BEHAVIOR—MYTHS AND MISCONCEPTIONS 
With or without policy, bystanders respond in MCIs. There are many myths related 
to disaster response and human behavior. One of the common misconceptions is that, 
during disasters, structures break down and chaos ensues. Planners often assume that 
antisocial and irrational behavior will emerge after a disaster, especially in the immediate 
aftermath.60 However, as shown in the vignettes that follow, sense of community, 
cohesion, and altruism prevail. Existing social structures and constructs remain in place, 
even as the system and components adapt to new conditions. The people who are affected 
by the MCI are the first to help themselves; immediate responders therefore offer a quick 
and effective immediate response.61 The misconceptions persist nonetheless, which causes 
emergency response teams to discount immediate responders as a resource. This leads to 
poor planning and ultimately negatively affects the overall response operation and 
outcome. 
 
60 Russell Dynes, “Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate 
Analogies,” International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 12, no. 2 (1994): 141–158. 
61 Dennis Wenger, E.L. Quarantelli, and Russell Dynes, “Disaster Analysis: Emergency Management 
Offices and Arrangements” (report, Disaster Research Center, February 1987), https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/
citations/ADA179024. 
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It is important to understand the origins of disaster planning and the assumptions 
on which it is based. Likewise, it is critical to acknowledge the actual human behavior that 
has been consistently observed during MCIs, as it suggests predictable behavior that will 
be seen during future events. The vignettes and explanations that follow explore the 
assumptions and actual behavior for three themes: disaster syndrome, panic, and social 
breakdown. 
1. Disaster Syndrome 
Madrid: Mobilized by Mayhem 
On March 11, 2004, in Madrid, Spain, a group of terrorists planted thirteen bomb 
bags across four trains, set to detonate at various train stations.62 The bombs on three of 
the trains detonated while the trains were at passenger stations; the bombs on the fourth 
train, which was behind schedule, exploded along a nearby street.63 The explosives, rigged 
with shrapnel, killed 190 people and injured 1,800 more.64 
Victims immediately reacted. They instantly realized a threat and took action to 
protect themselves and each other. Those who were able immediately evacuated the four 
sites, often carrying the injured with them. The victims and immediate responders began 
to treat the wounded. The survivors banded together to carry patients outside of the station, 
where private vehicles transported people with serious and minor injuries alike, long before 
EMS could manage the scene. At Tellez station, people watching from surrounding 
balconies threw down sheets and blankets to assist, while others assisted emergency 
personnel in transitioning a nearby sports pavilion into a treatment area.65 Due to 
insufficient EMS resources at the nearby El Pozo station, civilians assumed responsibility 
 
62 “Spain Train Bombings Fast Facts,” CNN, February 26, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/
world/europe/spain-train-bombings-fast-facts/index.html. 
63 “Scores Die in Madrid Bomb Carnage,” BBC, March 11, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
3500452.stm. 
64 “The 3/11 Madrid Bombings: An Assessment after 5 Years,” Wilson Center, April 6, 2009, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-311-madrid-bombings-assessment-after-5-years. 
65 López Carresi, “The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings.”  
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for both treatment and transport.66 Those involved made an immediate transition from 
victim to responder. 
*** 
Time after time, during actual disasters, immediate responders do intervene, and 
are rarely deterred from doing so. However, much of the early research about bystander 
intervention was conducted in laboratories rather than through case studies. In these lab 
simulations, which observed a single person in need, bystander action was relatively low 
and could be manipulated by several factors.67 Those studies have likely contributed to the 
belief that bystanders will not or cannot act during an MCI. Much of the early literature 
searched for reasons to explain the lack of bystander intervention.68 One reason, suggested 
researchers, was the idea of disaster shock, which is more commonly known as disaster 
syndrome.69 
Disaster syndrome is the stunned incapacitation that some victims feel after a 
disaster. This psychological condition leaves victims in a sort of shock during which they 
are unable to help themselves or others. The theory explains that victims and bystanders 
who suffer this syndrome will need help from an outside entity, such as an emergency 
response agency.70 Disaster syndrome has been touted as one of the critical roles of, and 
reasons behind, the command-and-control system that emergency services have adopted 
for MCI response. Dennis Wenger, E. L. Quarantelli, and Russell Dynes came together to 
refute disaster syndrome and Erik Auf der Heide presented additional evidence against its 
 
66 J. Peral Gutierrez de Ceballos et al., “11 March 2004: The Terrorist Bomb Explosions in Madrid, 
Spain—An Analysis of the Logistics, Injuries Sustained and Clinical Management of Casualties Treated at 
the Closest Hospital,” Critical Care 9, no. 1 (November 3, 2004): 104, https://doi.org/10.1186/cc2995. 
67 Latane and Darley, “Group Inhibition.” 
68 Latane and Darley, “Bystander ‘Apathy.’” 
69 Margaret O’Leary, The First 72 Hours: A Community Approach to Disaster Preparedness 
(Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2004), 72. 
70 E.L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, “Editors’ Introduction,” The American Behavioral Scientist 
13, no. 3 (January 1, 1970): 325–30. 
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legitimacy.71 Hugh Stephens later supported their work, showing that victims and 
bystanders at the Texas City explosions and fires of 1947 were not incapacitated but rather 
helped themselves long before traditional emergency services could arrive.72 
As seen in the examples throughout this thesis, neither victims nor bystanders 
become immobilized by even the most catastrophic events.73 They also do not passively 
await treatment by designated emergency response agencies.74 Instead, they show a great 
deal of self-initiative, which often leads to group initiative.75 Immediate responders take 
control of their fate and move toward resolution. As they do so, they maintain their routine 
morals and sense of community, coming to the aid of victims who cannot help themselves. 
Many emergency response plans consider that disaster syndrome will befall many 
victims and bystanders. Based on this assumption, one role of the response organizations 
is to provide paternalistic reassurance that will help victims out of this daze. In reality, only 
a small portion of victims have reported feeling dazed after a violent event—and they were 
able to resolve it on their own almost immediately.76 Immediate responders and victims 
alike actively provide treatment and transport for themselves and others. As people often 
act under normal circumstances, emergency services are reserved as a last resort, only if 
the victims cannot otherwise take care of themselves.77 
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2. Panic 
Las Vegas: Rapid Fire to Rapid Action 
Over 22,000 people were enjoying the live music, warm weather, and good 
company at the Route 91 Harvest Festival in Las Vegas on October 1, 2017. They had 
traveled from all over the country to attend the multiday music festival staged in the 
outdoor Las Vegas Village. Across the street, and nearly four hundred feet above, Stephen 
Paddock, a sixty-four-year-old retired real estate businessman, broke the window of room 
32-135 at the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino, where he had been staying for the past six 
nights. About twenty-five minutes into Jason Aldean’s performance on the mainstage, at 
10:05 PM, Paddock chose one of the twenty-three firearms he had amassed in his hotel 
room, took precise aim at the crowd, and opened fire on the unsuspecting concertgoers. 
Over the next ten minutes, Paddock’s weapons rained down devastating, high-power 
rounds, killing fifty-two and injuring more than eight hundred others. 
Immediately following the event, rational behavior prevailed. Most in the crowd 
did not immediately recognize the threat. They noticed the band flee the stage, and some 
were confused as people around them dropped to the ground, splattering them with blood. 
As the band was silenced, the sound of rapid fire became clear. Most sought cover in the 
open venue; others sprang into action. Immediate responders and patients alike took charge 
of their wellbeing and sought transportation. Off-duty police officers and medical 
responders provided their own personal tourniquets to victims and loaded them into 
privately owned vehicles.78 Uninjured concertgoers removed their belts and shirts to create 
improvised tourniquets and dressings.79 Immediate responders dragged patients and used 
tarps to create stretchers to get patients to safety.  
*** 
Contrary to disaster syndrome—the idea that bystanders become immobilized by 
an MCI—there is a popular belief that panic overcomes victims and bystanders of 
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disasters.80 The belief, fueled by movies and media, is that people become hysterical and 
lose control, leading to a state of personal and group chaos.81 It is suggested that any type 
of physical destruction will be accompanied by psychological and social destruction.82 
Because this behavior is rampant, it is held, civilians cannot be trusted to react reasonably 
and responsibly following a disaster and, as such, require heavy government involvement 
to control the situation and care for the victims.  
The definition of panic varies slightly depending on the source. The consistent 
themes in definitions include: 
• Sudden, overpowering fright 
• Unreasoning terror causing mass flight 
• Irrational and hysterical behavior 
• Lack of self-control 
• Frantic actions 
• Unreasonable, irrational thought and action 
Other sources claim that panic causes an individual to lose concern for others.83 
During this time, according to those sources, civilization erodes.84 It is thought that victims 
become competitive and selfish in their pursuit of self-preservation. The theory explains 
that the panic and chaos can be more dangerous than the triggering event, causing 
pandemonium and stampedes of people during the frenzied escape.85 This is why the 
public has been told not to yell “fire!” in a crowded movie theater: the ensuing panic would 
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cause more harm than the fire itself. It is argued that this irrational, uncontrollable behavior 
requires intervention from professional rescuers, who can restore the personal and societal 
norms that will allow for response and recovery. This has become a major driving factor 
for a command-and-control approach by public safety when responding to MCIs. 
Despite the persistence of this image of post-disaster reactions, panic rarely occurs. 
While the word is often used by witnesses and responders alike, the behavior they describe 
does not align with the characteristics associated with the word panic. The behavior that 
they describe is rational action driven by fear and threat, such as quickly evacuating. In this 
sense, the word panic has been used to describe any behavior that is sudden—or rushed—
and that results from fear.86 The actions of survivors and immediate responders, though 
sparked by fear and novelty, are controlled, deliberate, and reasonable responses to a threat. 
The victims and immediate responders exhibit rationality as they show more self- and 
small-group initiative than they do in normal circumstances.87 Instead of panicking, the 
individuals and the collective group act in an orderly fashion as they carry out mission-
driven actions, such as moving to safety, evacuating others, and treating the injured. While 
it may not be coordinated and orchestrated by a single command authority, it is purposeful, 
deliberate action. Running scared from an active shooter or a bomb site is not panic; it is 
perhaps the most logical, self-preserving, healthy reaction one could hope to have in that 
scenario. The victim and immediate responder intuition to immediately flee is a survival 
mechanism that works, not a byproduct of hysteria. 
In fact, it has been shown that people, just like society, tend to continue to function 
in the same manner that they would under normal circumstances during an emergency. 
Rather than changing dramatically in the face of emergency, the individual’s first and 
perhaps easiest reaction is one of trying to maintain status quo. Those who are prone to 
anxiety in routine life will likely react with anxiety when stressed. Similarly, those who are 
inclined to help others, or have a usual sense of calm when stressed, exhibit that same 
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general behavior as the default reaction to an emergency. The people who do panic, in the 
strictest sense of the word, are a minority of the population, and the panic is short-lived 
and does not impact others or the trajectory of the event. In a study of more than five 
hundred disasters, the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware found that 
panic was “of very little practical or operational importance,” and “is something that can 
almost be ignored in disaster planning and managing, except for the keeping in mind that 
it is a myth and not something to be assumed.”88 
Despite the evidence presented in after-action reviews and sociological studies over 
the past several decades, the concept of panic continues to manifest in disaster planning 
assumptions. It is unclear why this belief persists, apparently immune to observations of 
MCIs. It is so pervasive that even when rescuers have witnessed calm, rational, helpful 
behavior during disasters to which they have responded, they have dismissed such behavior 
as anomalous, attributing individual calm and social cohesion to the unique circumstances 
of that specific event, or the resilient spirit of the particular population impacted.89 
Perhaps semantics drive the confusion, as the word panic is often used to describe 
any sudden behavior driven by fear. For example, a rescuer at the Murrah Building 
bombing reported: “Absolute panic was rampant in the building during the first hour to 
hour and a half. The building had so many access points that it was difficult to keep anyone 
from entering.”90 What the rescuer is describing is not panic but a rational reaction of the 
community to enter the building to help survivors. The responder used words that suggest 
an undesirable response by immediate responders when, in fact, the behavior he was 
describing was a noble response to help those in need. This is not indicative of the selfish 
and competitive behavior that has been associated with panic.91 
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Others have suggested that it is self- or institutional interest that drives people to 
associate panic with the response of bystanders. Following 9/11, Kathleen Tierney noted a 
resurgence of the panic narrative.92 She suggests that those agencies that report a fragile 
and unreliable public in the face of disaster have an interest in exerting more control, or 
expanding their organization, for more influence over, or more involvement in, homeland 
security. The institutions assert that strict lines of command and control are necessary to 
maintain civil society and provide optimal rescue.93 Indeed, the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) was developed in response to a mandate from the president 
of the United States through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the aftermath 
of 9/11. The hierarchical structure, a major initiative for the nascent DHS to influence local 
and state emergency operations, consists of a bureaucracy that does not allow for 
improvisation such as immediate responder action. Even with such structures and the 
growing influence of such agencies, immediate responders continue to respond to incidents 
in a rational and helpful manner. 
The panicky bystander narrative is exacerbated by the media. Henry Fischer’s 1998 
book, Response to Disaster: Fact versus Fiction and its Perpetuation, explores the reasons 
why such stereotypes continue to promulgate despite repeated case studies that prove 
otherwise, citing movies, television, media, and bystander accounts as the source of 
misinformation.94 Movies portray disasters in a dramatic light for obvious reasons. Media 
outlets tend to sensationalize events, choosing dramatic footage or an impactful personal 
quote, regardless of whether or not it is representative of the overall response.95  
Lee Clarke’s 2002 work also blames the media for the persistence of the image of 
bystander panic in the aftermath of a disaster, providing salient examples where calm and 
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rational, albeit rushed, action was observed.96 Clarke points to the media portrayal of 9/11, 
much of which showed civilians running down streets to escape the collapsing towers.97 
The actions represented a rational reaction to an immediate threat: expedient evacuation. 
But the actions were viewed as chaotic and hysterical and, therefore, must have been 
representative of panic. In reality, almost everyone who was below the point of impact at 
the World Trade Center buildings survived.98 The fact that such a high proportion of 
survival was even possible shows that people did not panic but rather created and executed 
an orderly and effective evacuation plan.99 
The panicked survivor and bystander narrative continues to reverberate from the 
public, government officials, response entities, witnesses, and even survivors themselves. 
But disaster sociologists have come to realize that panic is rare and, when it does happen, 
it affects only a small portion of survivors and bystanders and has minimal impact on the 
outcome of the event. Enrico Quarantelli, the cofounder of the Disaster Research Center 
and a renowned leader in disaster behavior research, said in 2002: 
I no longer believe the term “panic” should be treated as a social science 
concept. It is a label taken from popular discourse. During the whole history 
of [our] research involving nearly 700 different studies, I would be hard 
pressed to cite … but a very few marginal instances of anything that could 
be called panic behavior.100 
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3. Social Breakdown 
Order in Orlando 
Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, hosted its popular weekly Latin Night 
on June 12, 2016.101 About 320 people were in the club as last call neared at 2:00 AM. At 
about that time, Omar Mateen, a twenty-nine-year-old security guard who claimed to be 
acting in the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), parked his rental van 
in a neighboring parking lot.102 Mateen, wearing a plaid shirt and cargo pants and carrying 
a Sig Saur MCS semiautomatic rifle and a 9mm Glock 17 semiautomatic pistol, casually 
walked into the club, bypassing security.103 At 2:02 AM, just after entering, Mateen began 
indiscriminately shooting anyone he came across as he walked through the club.104 Mateen 
paused only long enough to make a 911 call to explain his motive as retaliation against 
U.S. involvement in Iraq and Syria.105 He fired hundreds of rounds before barricading 
himself in a bathroom, taking patrons as hostages.106 Before the event was over, Mateen 
killed forty-nine people and injured fifty-eight more.107 
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At the event, social order and compassion abounded. During the shooting, patrons 
immediately tried to flee and heroic immediate responders emerged. A bouncer at the club 
jumped over a locked door where many patrons were trapped, then released a second door, 
allowing all seventy people inside to safely escape.108 People shielded one another, 
including a man who covered survivor Patience Carter, just before he himself was shot and 
killed by Marteen.109 Jean Carlos Mendez Perez made it outside to safety, but returned to 
rescue Luis Daniel Wilson-Leon.110 Both were found shot and killed in the 
entranceway.111 A 911 call made by an unidentified patron barricaded in the bathroom 
reveals the caller comforting other hostages, trying to calm the scene and assuage their 
fears. The 911 operator asked the caller if he knew the people, to which he responded, “No, 
but I’m learning as I go. I don’t know people’s names but I do know faces I will never 
forget as long as I live.”112 The caller, continuing to care for the group with which he had 
bonded, helped evacuate the survivors from the bathroom once the wall was breached by 
police over three hours later.113 
*** 
A natural extension of individual panic or incapacitation is the idea that, as 
individual behavior aggregates during an MCI, the norms of society will collapse. The 
theory asserts that as people become more self-absorbed and competitive, social disorder 
will rise, destroying the basic tenets of community. Helping behavior dissipates, antisocial 
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behavior rises, and chaos ensues, according to this line of reasoning. In the interest of self-
preservation, people become hostile and aggressive toward others, it is presumed.114 
Therefore, the role of emergency services, in large part, is to maintain order and protect 
civil society. 
Quarantelli first challenged the notions of panic, looting, and antisocial behavior in 
1986.115 He provided examples when people did not panic, looting was rare, and antisocial 
behavior was virtually nonexistent.116 These findings, particularly against panic and 
looting, were supported by Auf der Heide in 1989.117 Norris Johnson, in 1987, showed 
that the portrayal of social breakdown and chaos following a disaster was inaccurate in 
nearly all cases, with any antisocial behavior being short-lived and of little impact.118  
The case studies in this thesis show that disasters do not tear apart communities or 
threaten social order. Instead, after processing and understanding the danger, immediate 
responders show adaptive positive behavior, adjusting to protect family, friends, strangers, 
and themselves. The response period is flooded with this altruistic behavior. On their own 
accord, immediate responders initiate care and transport of victims. In fact, the common 
threat has a unifying effect on the group of survivors.119 Group unity and social ties are 
strengthened as individuals unite to care for the injured. Rather than a collapse in social 
norms, disasters elicit more prosocial behavior than do routine circumstances.120 
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At the Murrah Building, hundreds of people converged on the scene immediately 
after the blast, forcing themselves into the building to help the injured. In Madrid, 
immediate responders continued to help survivors even after they realized that unexploded 
bombs still threatened the scene. Crowds joined forces to break down the barrier that 
separated injured spectators from EMS personnel during the Boston Marathon bombings. 
In Orlando, victims died while shielding others; some who escaped were ultimately killed 
when they returned into the building to help someone. In Las Vegas, rideshare drivers 
reported to the scene of the incident to offer their services. In each event, there were 
countless examples of strengthening—rather than degradation—of society. 
On September 11, 2001, an orderly evacuation was reported in all stairwells of the 
World Trade Center towers, which contributed heavily to the successful evacuation of 
approximately 95 percent of those in the towers who were below the impact floors. This 
effort clearly minimized the fatalities caused by the collapse of the structures.121 Much of 
this is owed to civilians like Rick Rescorla, head of security for Morgan Stanley, who led 
the evacuation of 2,687 people from Tower 2.122 He was killed when the towers collapsed, 
as he continued to work in the stairwell to guide tenants to safety.123 Elsewhere, groups 
joined together to carry disabled occupants down dozens of flights of stairs after the 
elevators were rendered useless. After the towers fell, among the one million pounds of 
rubble, acrid smoke, and dense dust, thousands of victims needed assistance. With a public 
safety system stunned by the enormity of the collapse, coupled with the instant loss of 
hundreds of firefighters, emergency medical providers, and police officers, civilians were 
forced to help themselves and each other.124 Photos and videos of the day show hundreds 
of images of people helping one another, tending to wounds or carrying someone to safety. 
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When a catastrophic disaster such as an intentional MCI strikes an area, the 
community rises to the occasion; the worst conditions bring out the best behaviors. Disaster 
researcher Neil Britton explains that “disasters reveal both elemental social processes of 
the social order and are explained by them.”125 This is because humans default to their 
normative morals and routines when stressed by a disaster.126 In fact, the magnitude of the 
event quickly diminishes outside influences and considerations, allowing people to be even 
more prosocial during disaster response. Unencumbered by the other normal competing 
priorities—appointments, work, family, friends, social standing, and other aspects of social 
life—victims and immediate responders devote themselves in their entirety to the response 
following an MCI. 
An example of societal order and cohesion following disaster is the Beverly Hills 
Supper Club fire that occurred on May 28, 1977. On a Saturday night over Memorial Day 
weekend, 3,000 people packed the club when a fire broke out in the Zebra Room. Once 
noticing the fire, the club employees maintained their pre-disaster role of serving the 
customers. The staff calmly announced the fire, explained exit routes, guided patrons down 
stairways, and crawled through smoke to reach those that became lost or incapacitated.127 
The victims were eager to be led and the staff eager to lead, just as they would be under 
normal circumstances. Patrons were orderly and respected the directions of staff. They 
remained calm, some even ordering cocktails to go before exiting.128 Two thirds of the 
young employees reported helping patrons, expressing that they felt responsible for tending 
to the customers, continuing their routine social expectations and structures. It is 
remarkable that more than half of the employees were less than 25 years old, with nearly a 
third being less than 21 years old.129 The young waitresses, busboys, and bartenders would 
save all but 167 of the nearly 3,000 patrons that night. Though it remains one of the 
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deadliest fires in U.S. history, it would have been more so if the staff and patrons of the 
club deviated from their normal roles and relationships, or if disorder emerged. 
The studies over several decades show that social disorder following a disaster 
simply does not happen. The literature and case reviews offer no evidence of this 
phenomenon. Instead, in a sea of disruption, the calm and orderly actions of the group stand 
out. Community bonds are strengthened, and altruism prevails. As such, the assumption 
that emergency services will be needed to restore and maintain order is unfounded. 
Emergency response entities should leverage immediate responders and exploit the 
stronger sense of community to best accomplish the overwhelming task of caring for the 
injured following an intentional MCI. 
B. EMERGENCE 
World Trade Center: Lifesaving Teams 
At and around the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, impromptu groups 
of people formed that would save many lives. Survivors of the attack and the subsequent 
collapse of the towers ran south to the water, where they were met by more than one 
hundred boats—ferries, tugboats, fishing boats, Coast Guard patrols, tour boats, and dinner 
cruise vessels—that had responded instinctively to evacuate them.130 In what would 
become the largest maritime evacuation in U.S. history, the team of boats evacuated more 
than 500,000 people to safety that day.131 
Frank De Martini, Pablo Ortiz, Pete Negron, and Carolos da Costa, all employees 
of the Port Authority of New York construction division, were on the eighty-eighth floor 
of the North Tower when the plane struck.132 Through dust, smoke, flames, and heat, the 
men cleared entrances to stairways, directed people to safety, freed those trapped in 
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elevators, and broke through drywall to free others.133 All four died when the building 
collapsed, but not before saving more than fifty lives.134  
*** 
Empowered immediate responders who act in response to an MCI become an 
emergent organization, which, in the context of MCIs, is an informal group of private 
citizens who work together to achieve common goals to mitigate the disaster. In the MCIs 
explored in this thesis, common goals include evacuation, patient care, and transportation 
of victims to hospitals. The emergent group has the response advantages of proximity, 
speed, efficiency, accountability, and empowerment to help victims.135 Situational 
factors—such as being on scene when the event occurred, feeling a sense of community 
with victims, possessing basic first aid knowledge, and understanding the direct impact of 
their actions—drive bystanders to emerge as immediate responders.136 This phenomenon 
occurred in every event studied within this thesis. Beyond those specific examples, 
immediate responder emergence is common following all types of disasters. 
The Disaster Research Center, which was established at Ohio State University in 
1963, initially sought to identify organizational behavior in stressful situations, such as in 
a military branch or office, rather than as it relates to individual or group actions.137 
Through the initial research, however, it became clear that individual stress and 
organizational stress are inextricably linked. Russell Dynes, one of the founding members 
of the Disaster Research Center, studied collective stress and bystander behavior following 
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disasters.138 In 1970, Arnold Parr was the first to identify immediate responder and victim 
behavior as “emergence,” referring to the chemical, biological, and systems theory of a 
group having properties and behaviors that the individuals in the group do not have on their 
own.139 By 1978, J. W. Bardo expanded this discussion, citing common characteristics of 
emergent behavior such as a lack of formal leadership, transient membership, instinctive 
understanding of roles, and shared purpose.140 Quarantelli, another founder of the Disaster 
Research Center, explained how emergent behavior can impact existing organizations and 
operations, such as public safety.141 
Dynes and Quarantelli continued to examine real-world events to apply the 
emergence framework and further define the actions of groups of collective bystanders.142 
They began to establish that the groups are cohesive, and that the bonds of community 
strengthen as a result of a disaster. They also showed how these emergent organizations 
interacted functionally.143 Numerous other researchers tested their hypotheses over the 
next two decades and supported the findings of Dynes and Quarantelli.144 
Researchers continued to explore the emergent phenomenon among bystanders, 
including the motivations behind immediate responder emergence and the structures that 
form as a result. Auf der Heide explains that these groups surface if demand exceeds 
available resources.145 Similarly, Richard Stallings and Quarantelli explain that when 
existing structures are insufficient, such as an emergency response system that is not 
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primed for disaster response, emergent groups will form.146 Dennis Wenger explains the 
same finding, but frames it in the context of community ownership: a society assertively 
handles the event if it feels no one else will.147 Charles Scawthorn and Wenger show how 
poor planning for emergent behavior exacerbates the impacts.148  
Dennis Milteti, Thomas Drabek, and John Hass first separated types of emergence 
according to the phase of the disaster in 1975.149 This work is important because it shows 
how the groups perform and interact differently depending on how much time has elapsed 
since the disaster began; for instance, the behavior is less organized and more difficult to 
coordinate in the immediate aftermath of an incident.150 Stallings and Quarantelli explored 
the specific relations that foster the new tasks.151 In 1981, Peter Munch and Charles 
Marske argued that action and order are separate, and a clear structure is therefore not 
required for the emergent group of immediate responders to be effective.152 In 1987, 
Quarantelli applied complexity theory to disaster sociology and emergent groups, creating 
new categories based on task and group composition.153 Sandra Bloom further explored 
emergence among complexity, showing that patterned behavior does represent some form 
of organization.154  
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There are multiple types of emergent phenomena. Active immediate responders fall 
into the category of group emergence, which is when a new group forms with new tasks 
and structures. A group of bystanders, which has never existed as a formal structure, will 
notice a problem that cannot be met by traditional structures, such as emergency medical 
services, either because of the delayed mobilization or sheer number of injured. The 
emergent group spontaneously volunteers and takes on evacuating, treating, and 
transporting the injured.155 While the group members may have been co-located prior to 
the event—at a concert or a marathon, for example—they are now united under a new 
premise and collective activity, and performing unexpected tasks, which constitutes an 
emergent group.156 As the magnitude and scope of an event grows, emergence grows as 
well, which explains why it is more evident in larger MCIs.157 
As the response progresses, the group of immediate responders continues to show 
the attributes of an emergent group. During the interim between the onset of the incident 
and when the professional help arrives, the group improvises to achieve the collective goal 
of saving others; for example, as seen in Las Vegas, they may commandeer personal 
vehicles for patient transport. Adaptability and creative problem solving are key attributes 
of emergent groups. During this time, the immediate responders are replacing the official 
entities traditionally assigned to this role simply because those organizations have not yet 
arrived, and the need is pressing. Even with no organizational structure and no authoritative 
leadership, the group instinctively understands its narrow role. Though the group may 
appear more chaotic than traditionally structured response organizations, there is order in 
the chaos. As others see the immediate responders in action, many join the group. 
Simultaneously, other members will physically leave the group, perhaps carrying victims 
to an ambulance or driving them to a hospital. In this way, the membership of the group is 
always in flux. With the changing membership, the importance of continuous feedback and 
learning remains important throughout the operation. 
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As professional rescuers arrive, the group will likely continue its work, especially 
in response to MCIs with a great many patients, such as the World Trade Center, Madrid 
train bombings, Boston Marathon, Las Vegas festival shooting, and Orlando nightclub 
shooting. The group may recognize the inadequacy of the resources available from EMS, 
or the group members may be impatient with bureaucratic command-and-control 
activities.158 The emergent group can also perpetuate due to the large geographic area of 
an MCI or a delay in rescuers reaching the scene, as was seen with the barricade in Orlando. 
Responding to the evolving conditions and feedback, the immediate responders may 
change their roles; for instance, they may begin taking patients to professional caregivers 
or ambulances rather than transporting them directly to the hospital. The emergent group 
now shifts from replacing an organization to supplementing it, another type of disruption 
seen in emergence. Nonetheless, the emergent group of immediate responders exists only 
temporarily. It disbands just as quickly as it formed; once the demand is alleviated, the 
group is dissolved, usually by the end of the crisis. There is no formal dissolution but rather 
a relaxed diffusion of the members. 
Emergency management recognizes spontaneous volunteers and donations during 
later phases of response and recovery. In fact, the National Response Framework includes 
an annex for volunteer and donation management. The focus of the annex is contributions 
that occur later, such as meal provision, housing, clothing and monetary donations, and 
personnel services.159 Yet emergency plans do not consider the emergent group of 
empowered immediate responders that drive the initial response of an MCI. Without 
incorporation of this known phenomenon, responses are prone to be plagued by duplicative 
work or, worse, conflicting efforts during a time when no resources can be spared. 
Emergent behavior occurs out of necessity: it starts because there are no formal 
emergency services immediately available to victims. But it continues even when 
professional response agencies arrive. This is partially because the volume of patients still 
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outweighs the resources available on the scene. It is also because the outdated, inflexible, 
and cumbersome command-and-control model used by EMS cannot adequately address an 
extraordinary MCI in a timely manner. Emergence fills this void. And, because the same 
outdated MCI approach is used by EMS across the United States and many other countries, 
emergence is not an aberration. It occurs at some level at every MCI and is occurring more 
frequently as violent MCIs become more commonplace and involve more victims. 
Emergence of immediate responders at an MCI cannot be stopped, nor should it be. It plays 
a critical role in addressing a novel, overwhelming situation where all resources are 
valuable. In this sense, immediate responder emergence should be viewed as a valuable 
resource to be leveraged to provide the optimal outcome for victims of an MCI. 
Emergence does produce several challenges for responders and incident 
management. Immediate responders can congest scenes and travel routes, making it 
difficult or impossible for professional rescuers to arrive and deliver care. Because there is 
no leader or hierarchy in the emergent group, incident commanders cannot easily 
communicate or integrate with the group during the response. Civilians are passionate 
about providing help but are often unaware of other considerations, such as even patient 
distribution to appropriate hospitals. The immediate responders see speed as one of their 
main advantages; when professional responders try to apply official decision-making 
processes or deliberately slower methods, immediate responders often become impatient 
and insubordinate. The constant changes to the group membership, a prevalent feature in 
emergent groups, make it difficult to establish and maintain a reliable and competent 
workforce. Immediate responders are not equipped with protective equipment and often 
put themselves in harm’s way, either knowingly or unknowingly, which can further stress 
the response system. 
C. SUMMARY 
Immediate responders are excluded from MCI plans, perhaps because of false 
assumptions that say bystanders tend to panic or are unwilling to help. However, recent 
events have disproven these myths. Bystanders and victims alike show prosocial and 
rational behavior. In fact, they often become an emergent group of immediate responders. 
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The group forms naturally, with no formal structure or leadership, advancing toward the 
goals of patient treatment, evacuation, and transportation. The group is dealt new and 
unfamiliar tasks, but it responds because the victims and event are not being addressed by 
traditional resources. Immediate responder groups form out of necessity, operate 
organically, and yield positive results. However, the untrained and unequipped emergent 
group can also produce challenges, such as a disconnect between incident command and 
the immediate responders, congestion at the scene, and the bypassing of EMS in favor of 
means that appear more expedient. Planners must be aware of both the positive and 
negative impacts of immediate responder action. 
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IV. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF IMMEDIATE 
RESPONDER ACTION IN MCIS 
Following disasters, such as the MCIs explored in this thesis, many bystanders 
become immediate responders. During and after violent attacks, these immediate 
responders begin evacuating, treating, and transporting themselves and each other to 
hospitals. Recent events have shown both the positive and negative impacts of immediate 
responder emergence. For example, immediate responders have provided life-saving 
treatment and transport for the severely injured, but they have also inaccurately prioritized 
patients, caused over-convergence at the closest hospital, and caught hospital resources 
off-guard in a system that expects prehospital treatment and notification by emergency 
medical services. This chapter explores the impact of immediate responders in more detail. 
A. POSITIVE IMPACTS OF IMMEDIATE RESPONDER ACTION 
The actions of immediate responders play a critical role in MCI response, especially 
those caused intentionally. Immediate responders are on the scene when the incident 
occurs, allowing them to render aid without delay. They also have access to areas that 
professional responders cannot get to quickly, often caused by scene security concerns. 
From providing immediate life-saving care to transporting victims, immediate responders 
fill the response gap and augment the strained emergency response system. 
1. Immediate Care and Life-Saving Interventions  
Boston: Critical Care on Boylston Street 
During the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev, age nineteen and twenty-six, respectively, walked into the dense crowd of 
spectators gathered on Boylston Street, a few hundred yards from the finish line.160 Each 
brother carried a backpack containing a pressure cooker. Following directions found in 
Inspire magazine, published by al Qaeda, the brothers had carefully rigged the pressure 
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cookers with explosives, blast caps, shrapnel, nails, and ball bearings.161 The pair carefully 
set their backpacks onto the sidewalk and walked away. The thousands of people in the 
crowd were focused on the marathon; no one noticed that a weapon of mass destruction 
had been dropped at their feet. At 2:49 PM, the first device was triggered by a radio-
controlled toy car remote, setting off an enormous explosion.162 Just fourteen seconds 
later, the second device, one block west of the first, was detonated.163 Within seconds, 
hundreds of spectators were severely maimed. The shrapnel and debris that was projected 
at hundreds of miles per hour at ground level immediately sheered limbs and major blood 
vessels. The debris, coupled with the blast wave, created life-threatening conditions for 70 
percent of the victims.164 
Like in similar emergencies, civilian responders emerged, treated, and provided 
transport to victims. As medical teams were unable to treat the plethora of victims and 
tourniquets were exhausted, immediate responders quickly used shirts, belts, and other 
devices to control bleeding.165 With the help of the civilians, 83 percent of patients with 
exsanguinating extremity wounds received tourniquets prior to arrival at the hospital, an 
intervention that certainly saved lives.166 Carlos Arredondo, who minutes earlier was 
passing out American flags to veteran runners, ran to a spectator who had lost both his legs, 
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controlled the bleeding and helped carry him to medical attention.167 Former New England 
Patriots player Joe Andruzzi was seen grabbing a woman and carrying her to a hospital.168 
These same citizens carried patients to medical tents and local hospitals. Within 
eighteen minutes of the event, all patients had been transported to a medical tent or hospital, 
with many of those transports conducted by civilians in an improvised fashion.169 The 
close proximity of several Level I and Level II trauma centers allowed patients to be 
relatively evenly distributed. Doctors present at the event and in receiving hospitals credit 
the immediate responders with saving lives because of the speed they afforded in treating 
and moving patients in a system that was vastly overwhelmed.170 
*** 
Throughout the world, the public understands that its role in a medical emergency 
is to summon help from professional responders. The time that passes between the onset 
of the emergency and when professional help can arrive is known as the “silent response 
gap,” according to Dr. Isaac Ashkenazi, professor of disaster medicine at Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev in Israel.171 In minor emergencies, this gap may not be impactful. 
However, when addressing life-threatening conditions, initiating care during this gap is 
critical to survival and minimizing morbidity. The public is in the closest proximity to 
injured people after emergencies. No matter how laudable the EMS response time, there 
will always be a delay. These delays, sometimes significant, can be caused by EMS taking 
and dispatching the call, traveling to the scene, navigating traffic, encountering other 
patients on the way, and traversing terrain of crowds and obstructions. During MCIs that 
are the result of violence, fire and rescue personnel can be further delayed due to ongoing 
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threats or secondary device detection. It is during this time that many civilians transition 
from passive bystanders to an active ones, becoming immediate responders.172 
Following a traumatic injury, hemorrhage is the leading cause of preventable 
death.173 With serious bleeding injuries, a person can bleed to death in as little as five to 
eight minutes, long before professional rescuers arrive. Even with the complete loss of a 
limb, external bleeding from an extremity can always be controlled. Relatively simple 
interventions, such as direct pressure, compression bandages, and tourniquets, can stanch 
bleeding until the victim receives definitive care. Wounds to the chest, abdomen, and back 
can be temporarily stabilized with an occlusive dressing. Even without treatment, a 
patient’s life can often be saved if they are simply transported to a hospital quickly. When 
neither immediate responders nor professional rescuers can reach patients promptly, the 
effects can be profound. A retrospective analysis of the wound patterns of those killed in 
the Pulse Nightclub shooting found that of the forty-nine dead, sixteen had injuries that 
would have been survivable if prehospital care had been provided within the first ten 
minutes.174 
Despite the devastating nature of the bombs at the Boston Marathon, only three 
people died. Referencing the flood of spectators who applied pressure and tourniquets to 
wounds, a study in the New England Journal of Medicine found that the low fatality rate 
was, in large part, due to the “courageous civilians.”175 Similarly, in Orlando, the quick 
action of immediate responders and law enforcement to transport patients to a Level I 
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trauma center only three blocks away allowed for early hemorrhage control and rapid 
resuscitation.176 
2. Additional Hospital Transport Assets 
Orlando: Outside the Club, Nowhere Close Enough to Help 
At the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando on June 12, 2016, even after victims 
escaped the building and were away from immediate danger, they were still nowhere close 
enough to the help they desperately needed. Emergency medical personnel were staged a 
block away from the club, waiting for the police to tell them the shooter was no longer a 
threat to them.177 Even the personnel staffing the fire station next door to the club, Orlando 
Fire Department Station 5, did not respond to knocks from victims, remaining on lockdown 
because of the nearby shooting.178 During that delay, immediate responder intervention 
was critical to saving lives. Patrons joined together to carry patients to ambulances blocks 
away. Others kept going, carrying patients the three blocks to Orlando Regional Medical 
Center. Officer Joe Imburgio of the Orlando Police Department had rushed to the scene to 
neutralize the shooter. His role quickly changed as immediate responders loaded his pickup 
truck with shooting victims and he ferried the makeshift ambulance back and forth.179
*** 
Prompt transportation to definitive care, such as hospitals, is just as important as 
immediate care for life-threatening injuries. Prehospital care can sustain many patients for 
some amount of time, but that period is finite. Serious wounds require professional 
intervention, including medication, procedures, specialty supplies, and surgery for 
stabilization, all of which require hospitalization. The limited number of ambulances at 
MCIs introduces a substantial challenge to expedient transportation of the injured. Because 
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of the lack of sufficient resources, along with real and perceived delays, immediate 
responders transport most patients from the scene to the hospital. 
At the World Trade Center attack, 93 percent of patients were transported by 
immediate responders.180 Following the Madrid train bombings, immediate responders 
brought 67 percent of patients to the hospital. After the Boston Marathon bombing, 
immediate responder assistance ensured that all patients reached a field medical tent or 
hospital within eighteen minutes.181 At the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando, a similar 
pattern emerged: immediate responders transported 70 percent of patients.182 And as Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers arrived at the Route 91 Harvest Festival, 
they began conducting improvised triage and used their cruisers to immediately transport 
patients.183 Rideshare drivers reported to the scene to offer rides to the injured.184 
Municipal bus drivers stopped at hotels and the venue to transport victims to hospitals.185 
Nonmedical personnel transported 50 percent of the patients, in most cases, before 
emergency medical services arrived.186 
Even when EMS is on the scene, survivors will often bypass established triage and 
treatment sites.187 Sometimes survivors and immediate responders do not even know these 
options exist because they are not readily apparent. Other times victims will choose to 
bypass these scene services either because they appear to be saturated with patients or 
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because they are viewed as a lower level of care than what is available at the hospital.188 
In general, survivors will use the most expedient means to access hospital care.189 
Just as with initial treatment, transport by immediate responders provides an 
important force multiplier. It allows for diffusion of the burden of transport across a number 
of resources, including self-transport and buddy transport. By adding personal cars, taxis, 
ride shares, buses, police cars, and other nonmedical vehicles as transport options, the 
victims are delivered to the hospital faster than they would be by relying on ambulances 
alone. Some patients transported by a means other than EMS arrive to the hospital in the 
same state as they were found, with no treatment conducted to stabilize their injuries.190 
However, recognizing that the definitive care for a trauma patient is a hospital setting, 
leveraging all available treatment and transport resources to minimize delay in patient 
arrival is important.191 This tactic provides an arguably better outcome than forcing 
patients to wait until sufficient traditional EMS resources are available.192 
B. CHALLENGES OF IMMEDIATE RESPONDER INTERVENTION 
Recognizing the positive outcomes of immediate responder actions, researchers 
have explored how that same behavior could inadvertently have negative impacts as well. 
Ronald Perry explains how disaster itself disrupts normal society and social behavior, and 
even positive behavior can have a far-reaching impact beyond the disaster.193 Gary Kreps 
and Susan Bosworth believe that the helping behavior could prevent people from 
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contributing to their normal roles in society, thereby broadening the impact.194 Auf der 
Heide also discusses the more immediate shortfalls of bystander action, mainly the lack of 
centralized coordination.195 Auf der Heide’s later research elaborates on how the lack of 
coordination among immediate responders and response agencies manifests; for instance, 
immediate responder intervention can make it so emergency medical services are unable 
to control the scene, which can lead to several undesirable outcomes.196 Wenger, 
Quarantelli, and Dynes explain that professional responders are often distracted by over-
convergence of volunteers.197 At times, immediate responders are so inclined to help that 
emergency personnel must physically restrain the immediate responders from exposing 
themselves to more danger.198 This builds on the previous literature, showing that not only 
does immediate responder action occur, it also has real impacts, both positive and negative. 
After-action reviews conducted by response agencies, media reports, and literature 
regarding recent MCIs have supported the fact that altruistic immediate responder behavior 
also produces challenges. One of the most common issues is poor distribution of patients 
to hospitals.199 EMS distributes patients according to urgency, type of injury, travel time, 
and hospital saturation. Untrained civilians tend to transport to the closest facility, which 
overwhelms that hospital and may not be the appropriate specialty center for the type of 
injury. Immediate responders also tend to attend to the first patient they come across, 
treating and transporting patients with relatively minor injuries while other patients with 
more severe injuries await help. This delays help to the seriously injured and also inundates 
the hospital with low-acuity patients, leading to a misappropriation of resources. Immediate 
responders offer a promising workforce multiplier that is critical during an MCI. However, 
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without a plan to incorporate immediate responders and manage their response, their 
goodwill will continue to be counterproductive in many respects. 
1. Poor Triage, Misdirected Efforts 
Las Vegas: An Ambush of Altruism 
As ambulances arrived to the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting on October 1, 
2017, they were overrun by well-meaning civilians who grabbed all medical equipment 
and took it to patients across the field.200 Ambulances and emergency personnel could not 
penetrate into the center of the field because they were confronted by wounded people upon 
their arrival on the periphery, further delaying professional care for some of the most 
dangerously injured. Immediate responders rushed the infield medical tent, causing several 
altercations, often exacerbated by intoxication.201 Desperately seeking a safe location, 
helpful civilians carried the wounded into nearby hotels. This caused confusion, as these 
hotels called 911 to report shooting victims, leading emergency response officials to 
assume there were multiple shooters in numerous hotels, further diluting and depleting 
their response assets.202 
*** 
When encountered with a volume of patients with injury patterns that will exhaust 
immediately available resources, medical providers are forced to assess patients and triage 
them according to the nature of their injury. This utilitarian method is meant to have 
maximum impact for the most people.203 Triage is intended to identify the small 
proportion of patients who are critically injured but salvageable, and direct the limited 
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resources and transport assets to them in the most expedient manner.204 Because of the 
unusual circumstances, this response differs from the typical patient assessment or the 
typical EMS decision-making process. During MCIs, providers must alter their standards 
of care, taking on a battlefield mentality and limiting treatment to damage control.205 
Patients are typically divided into the categories shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Triage Categories of Patients of Mass Casualty 
Incidents206 
Category Condition Treatment Typical 
Percentage of 
Total Patients 





These patients require 
immediate intervention 
and transport. They are to 
be treated and 
transported first.  
10% or less 
Yellow/Delayed Patients who have 
potentially life-
threatening injuries 
but do not need 
immediate 
intervention. 
These patients are 
currently stable but will 
need medical assistance 
within several hours. 
They do not require 
immediate transport but 
should be reassessed 
often and transported to a 
hospital as soon as the 
red patients are 
evacuated. 
~ 15% 
Green/Minor Patients who have 
minor injuries that 
are not life-
threatening. 
These patients, commonly 
referred to as walking 
wounded, do not need 
medical attention for 
several days. Transport 
~ 75–80% 
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Category Condition Treatment Typical 
Percentage of 
Total Patients 
should be delayed or 
alternative sites found to 
keep these patients from 
detracting from the care 
offered to the red and 
yellow patients. 
Black/Deceased Patients who have 
died or have 
injuries that will 
certainly lead to 
death. 
The severity of injuries 
and limited resources 
mean the patient is 
unlikely to survive 
regardless of 
interventions. Patients 
should be provided with 
palliative care, if possible, 
and not transported. 
N/A 
 
During this initial encounter with patients, providers are expected to perform only 
immediate life-saving interventions, such as adjusting airways or controlling a massive 
hemorrhage. Triage time is to be limited to a thirty- to sixty-second encounter with each 
patient.207 The existing model calls for patients to be treated and transported in order of 
triage categories. While awaiting transport, patients are staged in treatment areas where on-
scene clinicians can provide basic prehospital medical care. It is upon this model of sorting 
patients and regulating care that the entire continuum of care is based, from resource 
allocation, to rate of patient transport, to destination decision. 
Laypeople are rarely trained in medical care, much less the concepts and parameters 
of MCI triage. Civilians do not conduct thorough patient assessments and therefore can 
miss critical injuries. For example, an immediate responder may immediately treat profuse 
venous bleeding from an extremity, which is not life-threatening but is obvious, while 
completely overlooking a punctured chest wound, which is life-threatening but less 
conspicuous. Immediate responders are also unable to differentiate between severe injuries 
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and those that merely appear serious. In training scenarios, students often choose to address 
superficial bleeding before positioning a closed airway.208 Immediate responders also may 
be more familiar with skills such as superficial bleeding control than they are with others, 
such as airway management, that need to be administered urgently. Therefore, they may 
be able to treat only the less serious injuries, rather than knowingly deprioritizing the more 
severe conditions. Additionally, immediate responders devote time and resources to 
unsalvageable patients, such as those in traumatic cardiac arrest, while those with more 
promise of survival deteriorate nearby. Civilians will, understandably, prioritize family, 
friends, and those they know over strangers, regardless of the severity of the injury.209 
Finally, immediate responders tend to treat the first patient they come across; in doing so, 
it is rare that immediate responders accurately identify, then provide treatment to, the 10 
to 25 percent of patients who need immediate help.210 
Some of the recent antagonistic MCIs have resulted in staggering numbers of 
victims.211 In each case, 75 to 80 percent of these patients were walking wounded, 
meaning they did not need medical care for many hours or days.212 Nonetheless, due to 
their accessibility and sheer numbers, these patients overwhelmed resources and congested 
treatment areas, including hospitals.213 Many of these patients sought their own means of 
transportation and medical help, usually at the closest hospital, resulting in the closest 
medical resources being overwhelmed by lower-priority patients.214  
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Even on the scene, low-priority patients can cause misalignment of medical 
resources. At the Atocha station in Madrid, which has many exits and is close to many 
major roads, patients who had minor injuries exited the station in many different directions, 
intercepting EMS vehicles headed to the scene.215 The victims with more serious injuries 
who were unable to self-evacuate were left on the platform. EMS personnel were hindered 
from reaching the platform by the onslaught of people with minor injuries clogging streets, 
obstructing entrances, and demanding medical attention. Immediate responders and 
victims moved toward safety before EMS could establish treatment areas and, even once 
the areas were in place, victims bypassed the option, instead choosing immediate transport 
to definitive care. Meanwhile, the more severely injured patients had no choice but to await 
triage and transport from EMS, which led to a delayed arrival at a hospital. The Disaster 
Research Center notes that this results in “reverse-triage,” wherein the least serious patients 
arrive at the hospital first.216 Beyond the initial misallocation of resources, this can also 
lead receiving facilities to be unaware that more serious cases are yet to arrive.217 Hospitals 
are lulled into a false sense of security, assuming that the injuries they receive first are 
representative of the most severe patterns they will see, as is asserted in MCI response 
plans. Referring to the World Trade Center attack of 2001, Ronald Simon and Sheldon 
Teperman state, “It is clear from this attack and other disaster that local hospitals will 
rapidly be swamped by anyone that can get there on their own.”218 
With a significant imbalance between patient demand and medical resources, triage 
is a cornerstone of effective MCI management. On-scene triage is emphasized because it 
presents the first opportunity for medical professionals to evaluate the situation as a whole, 
begin prioritizing patients, allocate scarce resources, and initiate controlled patient flow 
through the continuum of care. In this way, triage sets the stage for the remainder of the 
incident management, both on scene and beyond. Undermining that foundational step can 
disrupt the expected flow of patients in terms of acuity and rate. As more immediate 
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responders transport patients from MCIs, it will become important to adapt and develop 
new means of performing triage, most likely at the receiving facility.  
2. Maldistribution of Patients to Hospitals 
Madrid: Three Hundred Patients in One Hospital, Five in Another 
Following the train bombings in Madrid, the two closest hospitals were inundated 
with 48 percent of the patients; the remaining 52 percent were distributed to the other 
fifteen hospitals and primary health facilities.219 The closest hospital, Gregorio Marañόn, 
struggled to treat 312 patients over several hours, while Puerta de Hierro University 
Hospital, less than twenty-five minutes away, received only five patients.220 The nearby 
military hospital (Central de la Defensa), which permanently maintains a large bed and 
staff capacity to receive MCI patients and had been used in every disaster exercise 
previously, received only fifty-seven patients.221 Public safety entities did not have control 
over the scene or distribution of patients following the event; the public did.222 
*** 
A consistent challenge with immediate responder action following MCIs is the 
unequal distribution of patients to surrounding hospitals, with the closest hospital receiving 
the majority of patients.223 The Disaster Research Center found that in 75 percent of MCIs, 
more than half of the patients were transported to the closest hospital.224 In 46 percent of 
the cases, more than 75 percent of patients went to the closest hospital.225 In these cases, 
the underused—or unused—surrounding hospitals had an average bed vacancy of 
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20 percent.226 Of the 7,364 patients from the 9/11 World Trade Center attack, less than 
7 percent were transported to the hospital by emergency medical services; the rest self-
transported or were brought by immediate responders.227 Not surprisingly, the hospitals 
closest to the scene were overwhelmed with patients while hospitals only slightly farther 
away were underutilized.228 
After the Pulse Nightclub shooting, Orlando Regional Medical Center, the closest 
hospital to the incident, treated forty-nine of the fifty-eight victims (85 percent) transported 
to hospitals.229 The sheer number of patients challenged resources, as did their rate of 
arrival. Within thirty-six minutes, the hospital had received thirty-six patients with gunshot 
wounds who had been transported by police cars and vans, private cars driven by 
immediate responders, and by the patients themselves, if they were able to walk.230  
Following the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting, immediate responders quickly 
transported patients to the closest hospital, upending Metropolitan Las Vegas’s trauma 
response plan, which calls for even distribution of MCI patients. Sunrise Hospital and 
Medical Center, a Level II trauma center, received 199 patients in the first few hours.231 
Staff, resources, and physical space ran thin at Sunrise, which used all of its universally 
compatible O-negative blood in the twenty-eight surgeries it completed in the first twenty-
four hours after the shooting.232 Meanwhile, the University Medical Center, three miles 
away and the state’s most comprehensive trauma center, received only 104 patients and 
reported that many of its beds went unused.233 Hours after the incident, the University 
Medical Center still had nine empty trauma rooms and three open operating rooms.234 
 
226 Auf der Heide, 41. 
227 Auf der Heide. 
228 Simon and Teperman, “The World Trade Center Attack. 
229 Cheatham et al., “Orlando Regional Medical Center Responds.” 
230 Aboraya, “Chaos in the ER.” 





This poor distribution occurs when patients are transported by means other than 
EMS, often bypassing triage and transportation disposition points.235 Ideally, the patients 
with minor injuries who are able to self-evacuate would be directed to more distant 
hospitals, conserving the nearby resources for the severely injured.236 However, without 
EMS managing the distribution, it is impossible to control the patients’ destination, the 
quantity that arrives at each hospital, or the rate of arrival.237 This often causes the closest 
hospitals to become overwhelmed by an initial wave of minor injuries.238 In addition to 
occupying precious resources, these less serious patients congest the area, preventing more 
serious patients from receiving the critical care they need. 
The closest hospital is not always a specialty center, which is a facility designed 
with special care teams and capabilities to address severe, traumatic injuries seen in MCIs, 
such as amputations, pediatric patients, chemical exposure, burns, and spinal injuries. 
While community hospitals can perform some of the stabilizing treatments needed to keep 
a victim alive, a patient that needs specialty care must eventually be transported to a 
specialty facility. In traditional MCI response planning, EMS plays a critical role in 
identifying those patients and transporting them to the appropriate center. But, as 
demonstrated in the case studies, immediate responders will typically transport victims to 
the closest hospital, regardless of injury type. If the closest facility happens to be a specialty 
center, it risks being overwhelmed by patients who do not truly require specialty care. As 
mentioned, a Level II trauma specialty center received the majority of the victims in Las 
Vegas, most of whom could have been treated at a non-specialty center.239 Research shows 
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that, when overwhelmed during an MCI, a Level I trauma center quickly becomes 
dysfunctional, which can lead to higher victim mortality.240  
Distribution of casualties to the most suitable location for the patient and system is 
critical to the outcome of the patient and the functioning of the broader system.241 EMS 
must consider bed availability, the hospital’s ability to manage the specific wound pattern, 
and equitability among facilities.242 When EMS is unable to manage patient flow, it is 
critical for the health care domain to regain control of the situation very early on. This will 
result in redistribution of the patients to stabilize the system. If hospitals view patients as 
their property and do not transfer them, patient care is compromised.243 
During an MCI, hospitals must position themselves as casualty distribution stations 
rather than a final destination for definitive care for all who arrive, as they typically 
would.244 This means that the receiving facility must triage patients and determine who 
requires immediate, life-saving interventions. The remainder of the patients should be 
redistributed to other facilities via secondary transport.245 Patients with injuries that are 
not time-sensitive should be transported via ambulance, van, or bus to a hospital far enough 
away that it is not immediately impacted by the event.246 This distribution must be 
carefully orchestrated with all hospitals to absorb patients in a fashion that balances patient 
needs with system resources, and should be done in coordination with EMS, who will be 
bringing additional patients via ambulance from the scene.247 Ambulances should be 
directed to bypass the closest hospital if doing so will not impact patient care, in order to 
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avoid further contributing to the over-convergence at the facility.248 EMS must consider 
using what is known as the first-wave protocol, a formula of preplanning that determines 
surge capacity and distribution of a network of local hospitals.249 This controls not only 
the number of patients reporting to each hospital, but also the rate at which they arrive, one 
of the more critical aspects of MCI management.250 
During an MCI, it is impossible to prevent victims from being transported to 
hospitals by means other than ambulances; perhaps this is even desirable.251 Planners who 
incorrectly assume that EMS and public safety authorities will have control of patient 
distribution fail to prepare the system for this reality.252 Emergency plans must include 
stipulations to account for this practice and should provide a means for directing immediate 
responders to the most appropriate facility. This could include public address, radio, and 
emergency cellular push notifications. Public safety agencies can also provide throw kits 
containing first aid supplies for immediate responders to treat life-sustaining care during 
transport.253 Recognizing that the bulk of patients will self-evacuate to the nearest hospital, 
ambulances should consider transportation to other facilities.254 
3. No Notice to Hospitals, Unique Conditions of Patients 
Las Vegas: A Secondary MCI at the Hospital 
Following the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting in Las Vegas on October 1, 2017, 
hospitals were immediately overrun with patients, with little, if any, notice. The first 
patients to arrive at Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center, which ultimately received 220 
patients from the incident, arrived in police cars and private vehicles; the patients were 
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grievously injured, and the notification that EMS typically provides to hospitals was 
absent. A physician reported that there were three to four gunshot victims in each arriving 
police car and private vehicle.255 Ambulances were the last to arrive. The University 
Medical Center of Southern Nevada, which received 110 patients, reported the same 
pattern. 
As the patients arrived by means other than ambulances, hospital personnel were 
faced with unusual circumstances: catastrophically wounded patients arrived with no 
prehospital treatment. The volume of victims, varying degrees of injuries, and uncontrolled 
nature of the conditions created a secondary MCI at the hospitals themselves.256 At the 
time of the Las Vegas shooting, Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center had an emergency 
room staffed with four emergency physicians, one trauma surgeon, and one trauma 
resident.257 This small team took on the monumental and unconventional task of mass 
triage while also treating patients.258 
*** 
In an optimal response to an MCI, hospitals are notified early in the response so 
that staff, patients, equipment, and supplies can be adjusted to prepare for the inundation 
of victims. MCI planning assumes that hospitals will be provided with this time, usually 
because field providers alert them to incoming transports.259 In many MCIs, however, 
because so many patients self-evacuate prior to EMS arrival and control of the scene, the 
arrival of the patients themselves is the first notice to the hospitals, leaving hospital staff 
no time to prepare.260 A study by the Disaster Research Center shows that very few 
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hospitals receive this vital information in advance and are unaware that the MCI is 
occurring; they have no way of knowing the type of injuries, the number injured, the 
severity of casualties, and the count to be distributed to that particular facility.261 This 
leaves hospitals minimally prepared and forced to deal with a sudden influx of patients 
with only the resources immediately available.262 
Hospitals must adjust to account for the reality of immediate responder treatment 
and transport. Hospitals should expect to have little or no warning of the event and 
incoming patients.263 Because the least serious patients arrive first, hospitals should 
consider reserving beds, equipment, and staff resources for the more severe patients that 
will likely come as EMS is able to transport.264 All plans should include an assumption 
that the initial portions of the event will be handled only by in-house resources, as on-call 
resources will take time to deploy.265 Since most victims arrive within thirty minutes, and 
nearly all within ninety minutes, only the resources immediately available will have an 
impact on surge.266 Hospitals should plan on using other areas of the facility, such as 
cafeterias, waiting rooms, conference rooms, and parking garages, to conduct patient 
care.267 Capacity should be maximized by discharging patients, transferring patients to 
urgent care or surrounding hospitals, and cancelling elective surgeries. These techniques 
greatly increased capacity following the World Trade Center attack on 9/11.268  
Many promising practices for MCI management, including accounting for 
immediate responder participation, have emerged from Israeli, where frequent terror 
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attacks have forced the country to adapt to the demands of medical surge.269 Israel requires 
all hospital facilities to maintain the capability to immediately surge to 20 percent of the 
hospital’s normal capacity.270 Israeli practices show that hospitals need to adjust from 
providing traditional operations to serving as casualty clearing stations, which is critical 
with immediate responder action, as no formal triage has occurred before the victims arrive 
at the hospital. Upon recognition of an MCI, centralized management that oversees both 
the hospitals and prehospital system is established.271 Individual nurses are assigned to 
specific functional tasks, and those tasks remain their only responsibility throughout the 
duration of the event. Tasks might include emergency room patient evacuation, personnel 
recruitment, organization of emergency equipment, and quality assurance.272 An 
experienced senior surgeon is assigned to triage all patients before they enter the 
hospital.273 This system recognizes that hospitals are the first location where impactful 
control can be established, accounting for the helpful but uncontrolled role of immediate 
responders. 
The nontraditional nature of MCIs calls for unorthodox responses, such as 
dispatching public safety personnel to the hospitals. Perhaps most challenging to hospitals 
is the arrival of patients who have self-transported and have received no prehospital care. 
Hospitals must consider the need to move patients from vehicles other than ambulances 
and utilize personnel who are more familiar with patient stabilization and movement, such 
as fire and rescue personnel.274 Resources once intended to provide vast amounts of 
emergency equipment on the scene, such as MCI trucks and trailers, may be better utilized 
if deployed to hospitals, where surge supplies, equipment, and medications are not always 
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immediately accessible.275 Law enforcement should respond to provide scene security, 
information flow, and target hardening, as they did in Orlando and Las Vegas.276 Police 
should also establish perimeters around the facility to control access, stemming the flow of 
friends, family members, and media that can overrun the already crowded hospital.277 Law 
enforcement and public works should consider blocking roads to provide a dedicated 
corridor for patient transports and the arrival of surge staffing.278 These actions and 
adjustments allow for management of immediate responder interaction in an arena that is 
normally reserved for trained professionals. 
The on-scene impacts of immediate responder intervention, both positive and 
negative, monopolize much of the focus on the topic of immediate responders. It is 
important to note that those early on-scene actions by immediate responders create unique 
and overwhelming conditions for hospitals as well. The local hospitals may be even more 
stressed than the responders at the scene.279 The disproportionate distribution to the closest 
facilities magnifies these challenges and has been said to create a secondary MCI at the 
hospital itself.280 As throughput at these facilities lags, the negative effects cascade and 
cause inefficient management of the patients from the scene. While the influx and initial 
distribution of patients is out of the control of any one hospital, there are steps that have 
proven to minimize the impact, such as redistributing patients throughout the health care 
system once they arrive at the first hospital. 
C. SUMMARY 
Immediate responders are an important component of MCI response. With 
immediate access to the scene, they fill the response gap between the onset of the event 
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and when EMS arrives. During this time, they provide immediate life-saving interventions, 
remove people from active threats, and transport victims to hospitals. However, the 
immediate responders also produce unintentional challenges, including overwhelming the 
closest hospital, misdirecting their medical efforts, and failing to notify hospitals of 
incoming patients. As emergency response systems look to leverage immediate responders, 
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V. FROM COMMAND AND CONTROL TO ANALYSIS AND 
ADAPTATION 
Many of the structures used by public safety organizations for incident management 
are derived from military applications. The hierarchical command-and-control model was 
adopted to identify clear objectives, lines of authority, and divisions of labor. While these 
constructs drive routine emergency response and are effective for small-scale incidents, they 
are incompatible with MCIs, especially those that include immediate responder emergence, 
which elevates the complexity of the event. Successful management of the emergency 
response to such an event will require a diversion from the traditional applications, and 
adoption of a method that takes into account the challenges of complexity and uncertainty. 
Recent MCIs call for a new paradigm to incident management—one that incorporates 
sensemaking, probing, analysis, responsiveness, and agility. 
A. COMMAND-AND-CONTROL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
One reason immediate responder emergence may be omitted from planning is because 
the structure does not align with the emergency management doctrine that has been promoted 
since the civil defense era.281 The early civil defense directors, the predecessors of the modern 
emergency manager, were usually military veterans.282 They pushed for a paramilitary style 
of organizing responses to emergencies, treating the disaster as the enemy. In an attempt to 
address the chaos brought about by disasters and to orchestrate the resources needed to 
respond, command and control became the emphasis. Standard operating procedures were 
developed to prescript responses, removing as much ambiguity as possible and pre-assigning 
roles and responsibilities. The approach included defined objectives, division of labor, 
reporting and command structures, and policies.283 The plans mimicked how government 
functions under routine circumstances, applying such practices to emergency scenarios. 
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Today, that same approach remains. Rigid, bureaucratic organizations exist at all 
levels of the government, and emergency response is no exception. From public safety to 
emergency management, command and control is the guiding principle. Thomas Drabek and 
David McEntire outline some of the planning assumptions that support the command-and-
control model, including: 
• If a bureaucratic response is enacted, no other response will happen 
simultaneously.  
• If provided with a set of policies and procedures that address all 
contingencies, the outcome of the response is predictable and controllable.  
• Disasters demand a strong paramilitary leadership style with a hierarchy 
for reporting and communicating directives. 
• Victims and bystanders will panic and become irrational, breaking down 
society and becoming counter-productive to effective response. 
• Civilians are uninterested or unwilling to respond to an emergency; they 
will be passive victims that require professional assistance.284 
Repeated studies have disproved these assumptions.285 However, this line of thinking 
remains, and immediate responder emergence does not fit into such a model. Many public 
safety plans therefore call for bystanders to be removed from the scene lest they impede the 
flow of professional rescuers and perpetuate the chaos of the incident. The immediate 
responder is treated as a problem rather than a resource to be leveraged. 
The command-and-control model has numerous flaws.286 The approach disregards 
actual human behavior that occurs after a disaster, which is impossible to control. Responders 
find themselves trying to apply constructs, policies, and approaches that are incompatible with 
the behavior of the victims and public. The centralized decision-making often misses the 
nuances of a complex and evolving system. The delayed feedback loop does not have the 
flexibility needed to adjust for changing demands or poor performance.  
It is understandable that public safety agencies wish to develop policies and 
procedures that create a uniform approach to the same threat, such as a single-family house 
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fire or motor vehicle accident; because such events have few variables, policies can address 
likely contingencies. Set tactics and training allow a diverse, large workforce to meet mission 
objectives while minimizing safety hazards. There are minimal variables to these events, so 
all contingencies can be addressed through policy. By enacting command-and-control, the 
outcome can be manipulated, and is predictable and consistent. 
Disasters, however, by their very nature, are not conducive to static approaches. 
Organizations are inherently less adaptive to disasters than individuals and small groups 
are.287 With the command-and-control approach, much like with medical treatment, response 
agencies attempt to address MCIs as a matter of quantity rather than quality; if a method works 
for a small-scale emergency with a small number of patients, planners presume that the same 
method will work for heavier demands as well. However, the policies, structures, and tactics 
used for a motor vehicle accident cannot be scaled to account for the novel complexities of an 
unpredictable, unstable MCI. MCIs are a challenge of quality, not quantity. The overall 
approach must be adjusted to deal with the qualitative differences. 
Similarly, as the magnitude of an event grows, so too will the number of immediate 
and professional responders. With the high volume of patients, immediate responders, and 
public safety personnel involved in an MCI, overall organizational control and coordination 
becomes less attainable.288 That said, the regimented coordination that is typically sought 
during the early stages of smaller emergencies is not realistic for effective management of 
large MCIs.289 Response agencies must simply become more comfortable with the period of 
apparent operational chaos that ensues between the onset of the incident and when traditional 
incident management structures can and should be established.290 It is during this time that 
critical and quick work is being performed to stabilize and transport patients, and disruption 
of that for the sake of a forced semblance of command and control would be detrimental. 
MCIs require a unique approach that is dynamic, innovative, unencumbered by bureaucracy, 
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and that embraces the evolving nature of the event, all of which is accounted for in an 
emergent approach. 
B. ORDER THROUGH CHAOS 
 In her work “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos: A Framework for Effective Initial 
Response Efforts to Large- Scale Incidents,” Cynthia Renaud recognizes the challenges of 
using the command-and-control model during MCIs.291 She explains that it takes time and 
resources to apply NIMS, which was developed after 9/11 as a framework for incident 
command. During this time, most public safety personnel, victims, and immediate responders 
will act independently, and orders issued by an incident commander will be ineffective. This 
chaos is normal, especially in large-scale events, and there is no way to stop it. Proper 
management of these incidents requires that commanders accept the chaos, manipulate the 
variables, and work toward a more controlled atmosphere that better lends itself to traditional 
NIMS application. 
Renaud likens this period to a theory in molecular biology known as the edge of 
chaos.292 She explains that on the edge of every cell, agents interact with one another, within 
their environment, without any higher order or direction. This looks like chaos and 
dysfunction as the agents try to instill some sort of order. The type of order that arises from 
this chaos determines if the cell ultimately lives or dies. Renaud analogizes this to emergency 
incidents, where the impact and nature of the incident occurs on the outside edge of the normal 
system of society. The event disrupts order and causes chaos while the members of the 
complex system begin to interact with each other and their environment in new, chaotic ways. 
The book Surfing the Edge of Chaos explains that “in the face of threat, or when galvanized 
by a compelling opportunity, living things move toward the edge of chaos. This condition 
evokes higher levels of mutation and experimentation, and fresh solutions are more likely to 
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edge of chaos. The responders must allow the chaos to play out, but also must manipulate it 
to facilitate and shape the type of order that emerges. This requires an incremental approach 
between chaos and order, though the current command and control edicts suggest an 
immediate transition between the two. 
C. INCIDENT LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK 
The phases of an emergency and the transitions between them can be examined 
through the lens of the Cynefin framework.294 The framework, developed by David Snowden 
in 1999 as a knowledge management tool for IBM, is a means for understanding reality in 
novel systems. Rather than a classification or categorization tool, it uses multiple ontological 
inputs, including the elements and relationships within the system, to analyze the situation 
and understand it in one of five domains: disorder, obvious, complicated, complex, and 
chaotic (variations of these names, which have emerged as Snowden has refined the 
framework, are included parenthetically in the introduction to each domain).295 This 
sensemaking tool allows leaders to understand the domain in which a system fits, thereby 
guiding them to respond appropriately for that type of system. Snowden explains the 
framework is one of sensemaking, which is “how we make sense of the world so we can act 
in it.”296 
According to Snowden, all problems and scenarios initially fall within the disorder 
(also known as aporia or confused) domain when it is first approached. Disorder is when the 
decision-maker is not sure into which domain the problem falls. Every incident and situation 
is approached under this categorization at first. However, decisions will be delayed, 
hampered, or incorrect if leaders cannot quickly move into one of the four main domains. 
Decision-makers who find themselves stuck in the disorder category choose courses of action 
that are comfortable or familiar. That natural response to rely on heuristics and cues can often 
lead to improper action that can, at best, prolong disorder and, at worst, steer an emergency 
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incident in the wrong direction. Therefore, it is critical for the incident commander to quickly 
engage in sensemaking to understand with which of the four primary domains the problem 
best aligns. 
The obvious (also known as simple, clear, or known) domain in the Cynefin 
framework describes when the circumstances and options are clear.297 There is little novelty 
and complexity in this domain, which makes it appropriate for a routine emergency response, 
such as a motor vehicle accident, where standing roles and expectations can apply. Standard 
operating procedures are designed for this type of event, as it is predictable and managed 
simply, which makes an obvious situation highly compatible with ICS. 
The complicated (also known as knowable) domain allows for several different 
courses of actions, all of which would be acceptable.298 While not necessarily novel, there 
are many parts and relationships between them, making it difficult to predict cause and effect. 
Decision-makers must analyze the situation and deliberate among options to determine the 
most appropriate course of action. A typical house fire would fall in this realm, as there are 
several methods and tactics to extinguish the fire. The incident commander must weigh the 
options to decide which approach, or which combination of approaches, is best. Traditional 
ICS works well in this environment as well. 
The next two domains are the most challenging for response agencies, in part because 
the normal ICS approach of management is inadequate. Complex situations are less 
predictable and do not readily lend themselves to a single correct solution.299 In the complex 
domain, it is best to concentrate less on controlling the situation and more on patiently 
observing and looking for patterns. Solutions must be tested, and many will fail, informing 
future actions. Long-term responses, such as the response to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, 
fall into this category.  
 




Chaotic environments are similar to complex ones, in that novelty, complexity, and 
changing conditions produce no clear courses of action.300 While situations in the complex 
domain allow time to probe for information, chaotic environments do not. In the chaotic 
domain, action of any type is needed. There should be an immediate feedback loop to evaluate 
the responses and adjust accordingly during this time. The early phases immediately following 
a violent MCI or similar disasters fall into the chaotic domain. The sudden shift in dynamics, 
immediate wounding of dozens or hundreds of people, ongoing threat, imbalance of 
resources, and disruption of the group’s understanding of the circumstances all contribute to 
abrupt chaos. 
From the incident commander perspective, MCIs, especially active or intentional 
MCIs, such as those seen at the World Trade Center attacks, Madrid bombings, Boston 
bombings, Pulse Nightclub shooting, and the Route 91 Harvest Festival shooting remain in 
the chaotic domain for quite some time. During this period many individuals and 
organizations will emerge to develop—or become—the solution. This is the type of 
environment where immediate responders emerge and take action to help one another. 
Incident commanders have no influence over these emergent groups of bystanders—which 
fall outside the normal scope of command and control—and a sense of disorder follows. The 
overwhelming scope of the event itself, as well as the number and nature of casualties, further 
contribute to challenges in regaining control, which can perpetuate the chaos. With little 
ability to influence the chaotic domain, incident commanders can feel as though the incident 
is beyond their control. 
The chaotic components following an MCI are challenging and will draw attention, 
especially to the incident commander who is concentrating on bringing about order. As 
demanding and seemingly overwhelming as these chaotic elements may be, however, the 
broader MCI is probably not entirely chaotic. In fact, the MCI response is likely so elaborate 
and diverse that each of the four primary domains align with one or more of the elements. In 
other words, some chaotic elements do not force the entire incident to become chaotic and 




element aligns, at least temporarily, allows the incident commander to take appropriate 
actions, when feasible, to lead the incident toward resolution. 
Immediate responder emergence and general bystander action will likely be in the 
chaotic domain during the early phases of MCI response. Each person—survivors, rescuers, 
and bystanders—will be conducting their own sensemaking, which will lead to a variety of 
responses. The complexity within and between the emerging groups will create a novel 
environment that is subjected to the quickly changing conditions. During this time, those 
impacted by the MCI will adapt to find solutions. Sensing the critical nature of the catastrophic 
injuries and ongoing threats, the emerging groups will take courses of action without probing 
for information. Incident commanders will be unable to bring order to this chaos. However, 
because the emergent group is probably effective in treating and moving patients, at least until 
more professional help arrives, they should not be dissuaded from doing so. While allowing 
prompt action of immediate responders and public safety personnel without concentrating on 
regaining immediate control, the incident commander monitors actions, encourages helpful 
behavior, and modifies or eliminates unhelpful behavior. In general, unless there is danger to 
immediate responders or others on the scene, the incident commander should not intervene, 
but should monitor the situation to determine if emergent groups and behavior are benefiting 
the response. During this time, public safety personnel and immediate responders may act 
independently, but they are working toward the desired outcome: evacuation, and patient care 
and transport. The professional rescuers will likely be operating in a more controlled 
fashion—or trying to, filling their intended, prescribed roles. 
Meanwhile, other facets of the incident may align with more orderly domains of the 
Cynefin framework. Unknown geographic boundaries of an MCI, such as an airliner crash 
site, would fall within the complex domain. There are knowable boundaries of the scene, but 
they are not known immediately upon arrival. In the early stages, it will be unclear exactly 
what is needed where, as it will be difficult to thoroughly saturate the area to gain the 
necessary level of analysis. Other deciding factors, such as a means of access to the site or 
determining if there is an ongoing threat, may remain unclear for some time. Different 
geographic areas of the incident, such as those where there is active fire, may need completely 
different response approaches. The incident commander can begin taking assertive actions by 
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sending units to different portions of the scene, with the goal of advancing the overall strategic 
objectives of the incident response. As responders arrive from different directions, encounter 
patients, and report observations, the incident commander will be probing as part of further 
sensemaking. The incident commander should be aware of, and consistently inquire about, 
the findings of units and personnel throughout the scene, recognizing successes and failures—
capitalizing on the former while abandoning the latter. 
The on-scene treatment of victims by professional responders falls into the 
complicated domain. The individual providers will have discretion over which patients are 
treated on the scene, in what order, and in what way, versus choosing to immediately transport 
the patient to the hospital. The varying conditions of the patients dictate that no single solution 
is the correct one, allowing for a more nuanced approach, entrusted to trained medical 
providers. The incident commander should not try to exert control over specific patient 
treatment decisions, but observe the global patterns that the treatment modalities are 
producing. For example, if too many providers shift their focus to intense treatment of a small 
group of patients, leaving others unattended, the incident commander should recognize this 
broader impact and use this knowledge to inform future decisions. 
Many facets of the seemingly chaotic event will actually fall within the obvious 
domain—for example, the locating and dispatching of response units during an MCI. In most 
areas, a well-established public safety answering point is in place to receive 911 calls and 
direct emergency resources. Following established policies and procedures while sourcing 
units according to dispatch patterns and mutual aid agreements, dispatchers can consistently 
and promptly provide the assets the incident commander requests. These routine portions that 
lend themselves to standing roles and expectations cannot be underestimated, as they usually 
represent the underpinnings of the overall response, even though they do not require much 
intervention from the incident commander. 
The challenge to the incident commander is evaluating all the components of the MCI 
using the Cynefin framework. By parsing out different aspects and assigning them the 
appropriate domains, the incident commander can begin to understand the status of the event 
and its components. This allows for distinction between areas of chaos and simplicity, driving 
incident commanders to acknowledge the elements they can influence. Further, by distilling 
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the complex incident down to manageable portions, management of the MCI may be less 
overwhelming to the incident commander. Figure 1 shows how multiple aspects of an MCI 
may fall into different domains at the same time, each signaling a specific type of action. 
 
Parsing out elements into specific domains allows the incident commander to understand which actions 
are most appropriate. Consistent sensemaking and reevaluation is necessary, as elements will move 
between domains. 
Figure 1. Example of Possible MCI Element Alignment with Cynefin 
Framework Domains 
Incident commanders have an advantage that allows for sensemaking: a trained 
force of professional rescuers that will fill their normal roles and expectations, such as 
providing patient care, without intervening direction. These personnel will likely move to 
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hierarchical structures, such as ICS, within their limited tasking or geographic region. 
These subsets of ICS throughout the scene are to be expected, but it must be recognized 
that true ICS, which encompasses the entire incident and the resources devoted thereto, 
will not be established until other aspects reach a state that is compatible with ICS. 
Nonetheless, the places where this organization can be established will be beneficial to the 
overall incident objectives. Localized ICS provides order for that specific group or 
function, permits professional responders to fill the roles to which they are accustomed, 
and sets the foundation for outward growth of this structure when other aspects move to a 
more ICS-compatible state. 
Cynefin is not a categorization model; through the sensemaking of the framework, 
however, incident commanders can align the components of the incident with specific 
domains, as would be expected. The purpose of this alignment, and the value of the 
framework, is that it drives the immediate action. The domain alignment directs the 
incident command toward the appropriate type of response. For example, once the incident 
commander classifies immediate responder emergence within the chaotic domain, he or 
she will know that trying to influence order or manipulate the effort would be futile. 
Instead, the incident commander allows the helping behavior to continue while 
concentrating on the aspects of incident that demand his or her attention and will benefit 
from assertive action, such as those elements in the complex and complicated domains. 
The novel, complex MCI environment is ever-evolving. Managing the incident 
requires constant vigilance and sensemaking. Elements will move between domains as the 
incident changes, prompting different action. Placing an element within a domain 
following the sensemaking process is meant to drive immediate, limited action. As soon as 
that action commences, the incident commander should reengage in sensemaking to 
reevaluate the element, especially in light of the action just instigated. 
As the incident progresses, ongoing sensemaking will likely show more elements 
moving to the obvious domain. The on-scene imbalance between resources and demand 
has shifted in favor of the resources as more personnel and units arrive and fewer patients 
remain on the scene. Command personnel have arrived who can assume functional or 
geographic assignments, which are now at a scale and level of simplicity that more closely 
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align with standard operating procedures and past experience. Immediate responders have 
either moved to the hospital with patients they have transported, dispersed, or been 
absorbed into other operational constructs under the NIMS structure. This represents the 
stabilization of the event, signaling a shift toward resolution and demobilization. When the 
MCI reaches this point, all the components understand their roles and responsibilities and 
carry them out in an orderly fashion according to standard operating procedures that are 
practiced and refined by the emergency response personnel. In the pattern of emergent 
groups described by Stallings and Quarantelli, the immediate responders will likely move 
into a subordinate supplemental role, or disband altogether, now that the response agencies 
have been able to meet the demand and assert control.301 
D. SUMMARY 
Hierarchical command and control, an incident management tool derived from the 
military, has been used by public safety agencies since the civil defense era. This approach, 
driven by clear lines of authority and divisions of labor, has been useful for small-scale 
incidents to which these agencies respond. Disasters, however, such as intentional MCIs, 
include levels of complexity, novelty, and uncertainty that are incompatible with the rigid 
bureaucracy of command and control. Successful incident management of MCIs can be 
achieved through sensemaking, such as that offered through the Cynefin framework. 
Through this process of constantly evaluating the evolving incident and elements, the 
leader can direct actions that are appropriate and effective for the nuanced portions of the 
incident response. Leaders who will manage these incidents must be taught to perform 
sensemaking, embrace uncertainty, and lead these complex incidents toward resolution. 
 
301 Stallings and Quarantelli, “Emergent Citizen Groups and Emergency Management.” 
79 
VI. DEVELOPING THE INCIDENT COMMANDER FOR THE 
MODERN MCI 
While the traditional approach to command and control must be adjusted to account 
for the unique conditions of MCI response, the need for strong leadership during these 
events is still critical. Incident commanders may not truly command all aspects of an 
incident, but under their direction the event can move to a desirable resolution. Recognizing 
that the responsibility to lead the response still belongs to the incident commander, the term 
will continue to be used in this thesis. 
MCIs that involve active violence and impact hundreds of victims, such as those 
presented within this thesis, are not immediately compatible with NIMS or any other 
traditional incident command structure, especially during the early stages of the response. 
These situations are novel, complex, and constantly changing—all characteristics that 
undermine typical ICS. This presents an overwhelming and frustrating tasking for incident 
commanders, who are typically charged with applying a fixed ICS structure to a familiar 
event with known components, including the personnel acting in the response operation. 
During an MCI, the incident commander is now faced with novel complexity unlike in any 
other routine incident to which they respond. Incident commanders find themselves 
battling the elements of the complex system to establish an incident management system; 
during this time, the response continues without regard for the incident commander. As the 
event becomes more complex or the number of patients increases, the number of immediate 
responders taking action will also increase, making command and control even less 
attainable. The incident commander is fighting a losing battle for order when the focus 
should instead be on finding and reaching solutions. 
A. BUSINESS AS USUAL DOES NOT WORK 
MCI management is unconducive to a typical command-and-control approach, as 
the quality of the emergency, not just the quantity of patients, is far different than in routine 
incidents. Responders are operating in areas where threats of violence still exist, patients 
present with unfamiliar and catastrophic wound patterns, nontraditional partners are 
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involved, the entire health care system is immediately overwhelmed, and immediate 
responders are heavily engaged in treatment and transport. These circumstances do not 
allow for scaling of routine command paradigms, as those structures do not account for the 
unique qualitative challenges. As such, the incident commander cannot follow the 
traditional approach of superimposing structures, roles, and responsibilities against 
resources. A playbook that would normally prove useful during a routine emergency is 
immediately rendered useless in this environment. This situation demands agility and 
responsiveness to the dynamic circumstances. 
Fire, rescue, EMS, and police incident commanders, who respond to and manage 
these MCIs, have long been taught that the gold standard for incident management is ICS 
and NIMS. Following the tradition of command and control, ICS and NIMS are 
incorporated into response plans, including those for MCIs. This approach, like other 
command-and-control models, attempts to plan for every contingency and have structures 
and hierarchies in place to address a known problem with a specific set of resources. The 
system does allow for some adaptability, depending on the scale and scope of the event, 
but it remains rigid in its bureaucracy and assumption of authority over the components of 
the system. ICS has been an effective tool to safely and consistently manage a routine event 
with expected behaviors, workforces, and outcomes. It allows responders and commanders 
alike to operate under standard policies and procedures and allows a uniform approach by 
all parties, leading to a concerted effort and predictable outcome.  
Incident commanders have been led to believe that the use of NIMS and ICS will 
provide order, which will allow for a controlled and predictable response operation. They 
use this approach on all of their routine incidents, creating proficiency through repetition. 
As each event passes, incident commanders develop more experience and refine their skills 
in accordance with NIMS and ICS principles. It is therefore presumed that scaling this 
structure to the increased demand of an MCI would be effective. However, this assumption 
fails to acknowledge the qualitative characteristics of an MCI that make it unique and 
incompatible with ICS and NIMS. Incident commanders who have mastered the constructs 
and administration of ICS and NIMS have a false sense of security if they assume these 
same approaches will work in MCIs. 
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In the case of incidents that involve immediate responder emergence, such as large 
MCIs, Dick Buck, Joseph Trainor, and Benigno Aguirre believe that “many social demands 
produced during disasters are too complex and unexpected to be handled by ICS. The 
command and control model does not currently, and given the social complexity, never 
will work for all phases of disaster operations.”302 The rigid paramilitary approach works 
for expected events with predictable outcomes, but is too outdated, inflexible, and 
cumbersome to be effective during MCIs. The highly bureaucratic form has been shown to 
take entirely too much time and requires too many resources to be stood up for an event of 
the magnitude of an MCI, making the structures impossible to establish during the early 
phases of disaster response. NIMS and ICS do not account for the edge of chaos or chaotic 
domain in which MCIs initially operate.303 The MCI does not allow for easy transition to 
the obvious domain, which is required to apply the heuristics and constructs of ICS. 
Immediate responders, a workforce that by its very nature does not fall within the scope of 
the commander’s control, further complicate the situation and confound commanders 
attempting to apply incompatible frameworks. Because of this, the structure that incident 
commanders have been taught to apply to every incident simply will not work during the 
immediate response to an MCI. 
Incident commanders need to understand that as long as NIMS and ICS do not 
address the initial chaos period of an MCI, these tools should be relegated to later phases. 
They must make use of all of the available resources in the complex system, orchestrate 
them to work together in whatever fashion is most effective, and drive the situation toward 
a resolution. If they expect to immediately implement NIMS and ICS, they do a disservice 
to themselves, responders, and the victims, as doing so detracts from the commander’s 
ability to exploit emergence to allow for a more natural and expedient resolution. The plan 
should call for NIMS and full ICS only once the environment, components, and 
circumstances allow so, which may be significantly later than what is currently expected. 
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Only once the situation is well into the complex, complicated, or obvious domains can 
either construct be effectively applied. 
B. DEVELOPING NEW SKILLS FOR MANAGEMENT OF MCIS 
To effectively manage immediate responder emergence and its broader impacts, 
incident commanders need to be equipped with a new set of skills. Since the period of 
chaos and intense complexity is not accounted for through NIMS and ICS, commanders 
are ill-equipped to lead the response efforts. Currently, there is no standardized training or 
education provided to incident commanders that teaches them how to work through these 
unique circumstances. The incident commander must be educated on how to use 
sensemaking tools and operate in chaotic environments to bring about resolution.  
A survey of emergency response leadership showed that many continue to believe 
in misconceptions, such as disaster syndrome, bystander panic, and social discord.304 In 
this sense, it is understandable why commanders continue to pursue order through the 
command-and-control approach. To alleviate this, immediate responder emergence, and 
accurate expectations regarding human behavior, must be accounted for within the incident 
commander’s plans and expectations.  
A reasonable start to developing leaders for this new paradigm is to teach them 
about accurate planning assumptions, correcting the now-debunked beliefs about bystander 
inaction, panic, and social breakdown. From there, incident commanders can develop an 
understanding of the psychology and sociology of victims and bystanders, which will in 
turn make them more capable of responding to the human behavior that will occur during 
MCIs. This will also help them understand why the commonly used command-and-control 
model is incongruent with human behavior and, when the two are in conflict, human 
behavior will prevail. When accounting for immediate responder action, incident 
commanders should understand the sociological normative for people—such as helping 
behavior, societal norms, and social order—as they will not differ much during times of 
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emergency.305 Rarely during times of stress can someone effectively be commanded to act 
in a way that is unnatural or novel. Therefore, it is more effective to plan for what people 
will naturally do, rather than expect them to conform to new, unfamiliar structures. If 
incident commanders take this to heart, they will move from commanding into leading, 
guiding the event toward resolution. 
The incident commander and field personnel must understand the sudden need for 
emergency response personnel to develop linkages with nontraditional partner agencies 
and groups, including immediate responders. Professional responders should understand 
that they will be forced to perform new or seldom-used tactics to meet an extraordinary 
demand. Individual immediate responders, and groups of immediate responders, will be at 
the scene on arrival, performing various functions. The immediate responders will continue 
engaging in helping behavior and will not be easily incorporated into rescue personnel’s 
existing command structures. When the coordination among the groups seems nonexistent 
or tenuous, professional responders will become uncomfortable. Public safety 
organizations will lose much of their autonomy to immediate responders during the 
organized chaos. Incident commanders should remind personnel that routine command 
structures are not to be expected in MCIs, and the appearance of poor coordination does 
not mean that the response is ineffective. 
The professional responders serving under the leadership of the incident 
commander will also need to become familiar with the new approach to incident 
management. Just as the incident commander has become accustomed to the ICS model 
that functions during routine emergencies, so too have the other response personnel. These 
personnel will need to understand that the incident does not allow for routine management. 
Many of these responders will not receive explicit direction the incident commander but 
will, by default, conduct their own sensemaking and perform their duties according to 
standard operating procedures and protocols. Perhaps most importantly, these responders 
will serve as sensors that provide valuable information to help the incident commander 
make sense of the situation.  
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Certain areas, functional or geographical, will lend themselves to traditional ICS. 
Therefore, responders will be expected to organize at this more tactical level, realizing they 
are operating within a complex system that has varying degrees of standard ICS applied 
during the initial chaos. The unit leaders and supervisors who usually fill general staff roles 
in the ICS structure will operate in the same fashion, adjusting their approach to the 
evolving circumstances. In this way, ICS may be established from a bottom-up method 
rather than the typical top-down. It may also form in decentralized segments, eventually 
being centralized by the incident commander when the circumstances allow for more order 
and control. 
C. APPLYING THE NEW SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE 
Incident commanders must understand complexity, sensemaking, emergence, and 
the interplay of the countless other variables that contribute to an event of this magnitude. 
Rather than merely trying to impose scripted responses to specific event types, incident 
commanders should be properly educated to process an event of any nature and magnitude, 
then develop the means to achieve the strategic goals.306 The incident commander must 
acknowledge the edge of chaos during which the initial phases of the MCI will take place. 
Responders should be reassured that this is normal and to be expected, and be comfortable 
operating in this environment. Commanders and first responders alike should allow the 
chaos to play out, paying close attention to successes and failures in their efforts.  
Incident commanders must also be able to accurately determine which Cynefin 
framework domain applies to each aspect of the incident. Commanders should be taught 
techniques to guide the sensemaking process and subsequent actions that will allow the 
leader to progress the incident towards resolution. They also must commit to constantly 
evaluating the efficacy of actions and performing ongoing assessments of each aspect, as 
these will evolve in the dynamic complex environment. This will allow the incident to be 
controlled gradually, but more effectively, while not impeding otherwise positive behavior 
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and outcomes. While processing the event and implementing the most meaningful 
solutions, the commander can still use NIMS for perhaps its more effective contribution to 
incident management: common language and resource typing. 
Incident commanders should be taught to develop broad strategic objectives rather 
than emphasizing structure and order. The objectives should be flexible to account for 
qualitative differences, and should avoid the minutiae of tactics. These goals and objectives 
could include delivering all patients to the appropriate receiving facility while distributing 
equitably across destination hospitals. Other goals can include ensuring rescuer and 
immediate responder health and safety, and maintaining the integrity of the health care 
system, with emphasis on the evolving demands and the need to remain agile.  
With these general objectives, public safety can help facilitate the various 
resources, including immediate responders, to most efficiently and effectively achieve the 
goals of the mission. A successful plan acknowledges and allows for ambiguity, complex 
systems of interdependence, and rapidly evolving conditions. One main objective should 
be leveraging and integrating all resources rather than supplanting them for the purposes 
of perceived order. By adjusting the approach, not only will immediate responder 
emergence be manageable, so too will the other facets of the event. 
Immediate responder emergence, though effective in quickly caring for patients at 
an MCI, contributes to the initial chaos that is outside the incident commander’s control. 
However, incident commanders must be taught to recognize the advantages of individuals 
and small groups that emerge, as they are more adaptive than traditional organizations, 
making them more suitable for the dynamics of the MCI. Emergence is more flexible, 
quicker, and more diffuse, which allows it to address some of the challenges of MCIs, 
especially in the immediate aftermath. Nonetheless, professional rescuers play an 
irreplaceable role in patient care and distribution of those patients throughout the hospital 
system, which is assured with the constructs of a formalized order. Both groups, impromptu 
and professional rescuers, can and should respond. Incident commanders should process 
and lead a response in a way that leverages all resources and guides the integrated effort of 
all parties to accomplish the common goals.  
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The novelty and complexity of a large MCI must be recognized, and incident 
management that coincides with its unique circumstances must be put in place. Emergency 
response officials need to be capable of processing complex and overwhelming events 
while carefully directing resources. To do so, the commander needs to recognize that many 
aspects of an MCI will, almost inevitably, be in the chaotic domain for an extended period 
of time. The official should avoid the urge to assert control over those points, instead 
allowing the complex system to care for itself while taking advantage of the time to make 
sense of the situation. Simultaneously, the incident commander can apply command and 
control, standard operating procedures, and rigid bureaucratic approaches to the aspects of 
the response and scene that fall within the obvious domain of the Cynefin framework. This 
hybrid approach of command and management will provide a more comprehensive and 
effective means of moving the entire incident toward resolution while respecting the 
autonomy and chaotic nature of some of the parts of the system. With this approach, over 
time, the commander will observe aspects as they transition to other domains of the Cynefin 
framework, working to bring about an effective order to emerge from the edge of chaos. 
D. SUMMARY 
Incident commanders have been taught that the command-and-control model of 
ICS and NIMS leads to ideal management of emergency response to incidents. This 
traditional structure is effective for most routine emergencies to which these agencies 
respond. However, because MCIs are complex, novel, and uncertain, they are not 
immediately compatible with ICS and NIMS. Immediate responders, who do not fall under 
the authority of the incident commander, are just one of the facets that contribute to the 
chaos of an MCI. Incident commanders must adapt new approaches to effectively manage 
an MCI. If incident commanders are taught about complexity theory and sensemaking, they 
will be better equipped to operate in this environment. Armed with an understanding of 
where each element aligns and the appropriate action for each, incident commanders can 
orchestrate the entire system toward a desirable resolution. Training potential immediate 
responders to ideally function within this system is one way to encourage helping behavior 
while enhancing the management and outcome. 
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VII. DEVELOPING A CULTURE OF HELPING BEHAVIOR 
The helping behavior exhibited by immediate responders has saved lives following 
antagonistic MCIs. During these events, the magnitude and volume of patients immediately 
overwhelms the health care system, demanding force multipliers. The catastrophic injury 
patterns require immediate life-saving action, which can be delivered by those on the scene. 
As the frequency and magnitude of these events continue to grow, bystanders must be 
encouraged and empowered to become immediate responders, developing a culture of 
helping behavior. Bystander cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) is one example of the 
public engaging in emergency response—one that can be used to inform this effort. 
Obstacles, such as civil liability, must be removed to encourage the public to respond. 
Emergency response agencies must develop a comprehensive training program to teach the 
public exactly when and how they should respond to MCIs in a way that complements—
rather than hinders—the work of professional responders. 
A. BYSTANDER CPR: A GLIMPSE INTO EMPOWERING THE PUBLIC 
CPR is a simple, noninvasive method to sustain the lives of people who are in 
cardiac arrest. CPR’s external chest compressions and respirations supply the body with 
oxygenated blood until the underlying cause can be corrected and the heart restarted. 
Usually delivered at first by bystanders, CPR fills the critical gap between the onset of the 
medical event and when professional rescuers arrive, keeping the patient viable until more 
invasive and pharmacological interventions can be performed. In the United States, 
bystander CPR is a case study in inculcating helping behavior among civilians.  
The roots of CPR can be traced to the mid-1700s when the Paris Academy of 
Sciences and Dr. James Curry endorsed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation for victims of 
drowning. Throughout the 1800s, doctors continued to experiment, primarily on animals, 
with the idea of providing compressions to mimic the pumping action of the heart. Most of 
those experiments involved internal chest massage, where the chest was cut open to allow 
for direct compression of the heart muscle. By the early 1900s, doctors were working on 
external chest compressions. In 1960, researchers combined external chest compressions 
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with mouth-to-mouth ventilations to create CPR. That year, the American Heart 
Association began delivering CPR courses to physicians. Six years later, the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences established standards for teaching 
and performing CPR. 
Over the next decade, scientists made progress toward addressing the underlying 
cause of most cardiac arrests, the abnormal electrical rhythms within the heart, with the use 
of defibrillation. This technique, which eventually used external electrodes, delivered 
shocks to the heart to reset the rhythm to a productive state. The push to deliver 
defibrillation outside of the hospital created advanced scope of practice providers—
paramedics—who could analyze cardiac rhythms, deliver defibrillation, and administer 
drugs to revive a patient in the prehospital setting. Even with improved response time and 
enhanced prehospital treatment capabilities, it became apparent that the likelihood of 
survival for out-of-hospital cardiac arrest (OHCA) deceased exponentially with each 
passing minute. Organizations and communities began to teach CPR to laypeople to deliver 
the life-sustaining treatment until professional medical help could arrive. 
It became clear that an engaged public was the critical link that gave cardiac arrest 
victims a fighting chance. In 1972, Dr. Leonard Cobb, a pioneer in emergency medical 
services, began providing civilian instruction in CPR. Within two years, the program 
delivered training to more than 100,000 people in the Seattle, Washington, area.307 
Institutions like the American Heart Association and the American Red Cross took the lead 
in canvasing the country to provide training to civilians. The outreach has lasted for 
decades, fueled by international studies that have found that bystander CPR can increase 
survival rates between 50 and 500 percent.308 In 1981, 911 call takers in King County, 
Washington, began providing pre-arrival CPR instructions to all callers to prompt 
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bystanders to act.309 Like previous efforts that came out of the innovative Seattle area, 
dispatcher-assisted telephone CPR became the standard across the United States, and is 
delivered still today. Since 2000, the industry has made CPR training even more accessible, 
offering online and self-paced courses, as well as take-home practice kits. The procedure 
itself has been simplified, including the elimination of rescue breaths, which were known 
to cause confusion and hesitation based on health concerns. Over fifty years, CPR has been 
ingrained as a part of American culture. 
Though the concept of CPR is well-known throughout the United States, it is not a 
complete success story. Even after fifty years of heavy emphasis, marketing, and teaching, 
only 46 percent of the approximately 383,000 Americans who suffered OHCA in 2017 
received bystander CPR.310 Of those, less than 45 percent survived to the hospitals. In all, 
fewer than 8 percent of OHCA victims survive to return to a normal lifestyle. Surveys and 
focus groups have revealed that many people will perform CPR for several reasons; chief 
among them are: 
• Inability to recognize OHCA 
• Insufficient CPR training 
• Concerns about liability and lawsuits for providing care 
• Fear, panic, confusion, and concerns over disease transmission311 
Many of the reasons participants said they were reluctant to perform CPR may be alleviated 
with enhanced training. However, despite numerous revisions to training material, 
respondents continue to report the same concerns. Further, less than 3 percent of the 
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American public is trained in CPR each year.312 With decreasing numbers of people being 
trained, and continued failure of those who have been trained when faced with an 
emergency, widespread bystander CPR continues to be a challenge in America.  
The parallels between bystander CPR and immediate responder action during MCIs 
are clear. In fact, CPR may be the very action immediate responders would need to perform 
following an MCI; and the same anxieties that prevent civilians from performing CPR are 
likely to arise for potential immediate responders at an MCI. With the help of instructors, 
however, potential bystanders can learn how to recognize an emergency, how to perform 
rescue skills, how the law protects them when lending assistance, the reality of disease 
exposure, and how to minimize risk. 
Following MCIs, there are often distinct injury patterns that, if left untreated, can 
be fatal—much like cardiac arrest. Treatment for these specific injuries should be the focus 
of immediate responder action, as their proximity and access allow them to offer life-saving 
interventions within minutes of the event. The educational program should include skills 
to treat external hemorrhage, airway compromise, chest penetrations, and hypothermia. 
The training should also be used as an opportunity to encourage desired behavior that will 
comport with the MCI policy. This should include personal preparedness, safety measures, 
how to prioritize patients, how and where to transport patients, and how to interact with 
professional rescuers to ensure an optimally coordinated effort. 
The effort to teach CPR throughout the United States has resulted in refined 
approaches for instruction to the public, with a curriculum and tone that is appropriate to 
teach emotionally difficult material to civilians. This same approach would be useful when 
preparing civilians for disaster response, as laypeople tend to become uncomfortable 
imagining themselves as a victim of violence. CPR institutions have also experimented 
with numerous delivery methods, some more successful than others. Traditional CPR 
training is provided through a course that is several hours long, usually through a civic or 
educational institution. The travel and time logistics of such courses have become an 
obstacle, however. In response, institutions have tried methods including train-the-trainer 
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layperson instruction, videos, online instruction, and simple poster presentations. All have 
been delivered at a lower cost than traditional courses and have reached a much broader 
audience. For the past decade, the American Heart Association has provided take-home 
videos along with a low-fidelity mannequin to practice compressions. This method has 
resulted in a surprising level of competence by students.313 It has had the unintended 
consequence of being used to teach family and friends when the package was at home, 
teaching approximately 3.8 people each time it was taken home.314 These teaching 
techniques should be considered when trying to reach the public to encourage immediate 
responder behavior following an MCI. 
B. GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS 
Good Samaritan laws are meant to protect people who help victims of emergencies 
from repercussions if their interventions inadvertently lead to further harm. The laws are 
intended to encourage immediate responder action by limiting criminal and civil exposure, 
which may otherwise discourage their involvement. In general, the laws apply to services 
rendered outside of a typical medical setting, during emergency conditions, where the 
provider is acting in good faith and reasonably, and there is no expectation of monetary 
compensation for the care.  
The earliest Good Samaritan laws were designed to protect doctors and other health 
care workers when providing aid outside of the clinical setting. Beyond medical 
professionals, policymakers realized that by allowing potential rescuers to concentrate 
solely on providing care rather than on the legal ramifications, society would be safer.315 
The murder of Kitty Genovese in New York City in 1964, witnessed by thirty-eight people 
who did not intervene, catalyzed numerous efforts to stimulate immediate responder 
assistance, including Good Samaritan policy.316 The push for civilian-delivered CPR 
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throughout the 1960s, followed by the advent of public access automated external 
defibrillators (AEDs), further solidified the need for a means to protect nonmedical 
providers when rendering care. 
In the United States, Good Samaritan laws are inconsistent across states and provide 
inadequate protection if the government wishes to encourage widespread action by 
immediate responders. Past experience domestically and abroad has shown that Good 
Samaritan protections, or lack thereof, do impact people’s willingness to serve. If the laws 
are insufficient, this can undermine helping behavior throughout society. To properly 
prepare and encourage immediate responders, laws must be bolstered and standardized. 
1. Good Samaritan Laws throughout the World 
Many countries have adopted Good Samaritan laws to protect civilians with good 
intentions. More than twenty-eight countries have laws that compel a person to render aid, 
or face a fine or jail.317 The Finnish Rescue Act requires that anyone who witnesses an 
emergency “make an emergency call and take rescue action without delay to the best of 
their abilities.”318 Germany has a similar requirement, but supports it by requiring 
everyone to take a first aid course before receiving a driver’s license. In a 2016 German 
case, four individuals were sought for violation of the criminal law for failing to help an 
eighty-two-year-old man who had collapsed in the street. Those wanted faced up to a year 
in prison.319 Likewise, Israel requires that civilians take action if they encounter a person 
in distress, or face fines. People who offer assistance in emergencies in Israel are entitled 
to compensation for any damages incurred as a result of providing help, per the same 
law.320 Those who fail to render aid in France face civil and criminal liability for the 
omission according to Criminal Code Art 223-6, punishable by up to five years in prison 
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and a fine of 75,000 euros.321 Portugal’s duty-to-act provision stipulates that failure to 
provide assistance is punishable by up to three months in jail.322 
2. Good Samaritan Law Challenges 
Challenges to the theory of protecting Good Samaritanism have been known to 
erode public trust. The failure to protect those who provide assistance during an emergency 
can discourage bystanders from helping those in need. In 2006, Xu Shoulan, an elderly 
citizen in the People’s Republic of China, disembarked a bus, fell, and broke her femur. 
Peng Yu, another citizen, encountered Xu, helped her, and transported her to the hospital. 
Xu accused Peng of causing the injury and demanded payment. In 2007, the Guolou 
District Court in Nanjing ruled in favor of Xu, stating that “no one in good conscience 
would help someone unless they felt guilty.”323 Peng was ordered to compensate Xu. The 
incident demonstrated that without a Good Samaritan law, the public is exposed to great 
risk if they decide to help in emergencies. Though hardly a new tactic in China, the case 
created a new wave of exploitation by criminals pretending to be victims, then suing or 
otherwise extorting the immediate responder who came to his or her aid. This marked the 
beginning of a noticeable decline of immediate responder action in the country. 
As helping behavior continued to decay in China, one case caught international 
attention. On October 13, 2011, a two-year-old girl, Wang Yue, was wandering in an alley 
outside of her father’s hardware store when she was hit by a van. The van fled and no one 
came to her aid. She was then struck by another van. Video surveillance caught the 
accident, followed by eighteen people passing by without rendering aid over the next ten 
minutes. Finally, a fifty-eight-year-old trash collector came to the child’s aid, moving her 
to safety and summoning help. The child eventually died in the hospital, sparking outrage 
across the globe. Many blamed the culture of distrust that came from incidents such as the 
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Peng Yu exploitation. Others, expanding upon the exploitation and side effects, stated that 
the lack of Good Samaritan protection had effectively staunched helping behavior by 
bystanders.324 Following the incident, Xia Xueluan of Peking University explained, “This 
kind of crisis is highly contagious and could deteriorate due to lack of legal support. As a 
netizen puts it, it’s not that the good people can no longer be found in our society. It’s that 
nobody can afford to do good deeds—the price can be too high.”325 Eight years later, 
following a spate of similar events, China enacted a Good Samaritan law that protected 
people who help those who are, or are believed to be, injured, ill, or in danger.326 
In 2004, the Good Samaritan law of California was tested when bystander Lisa 
Torti pulled a victim from a car crash where she believed the car was catching fire.327 The 
victim, Alexandra Van Horn, was paralyzed in the accident, which she attributed to Torti’s 
actions.328 At the time, Statute 1799.102 read: 
No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency 
care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages 
resulting from any act or omission. The scene of an emergency shall not 
include emergency departments and other places where medical care is 
usually offered.329 
Van Horn sued Torti for negligence. The trial judge originally dismissed the suit on the 
grounds that the Good Samaritan law protected Torti. The California Supreme Court, 
however, overruled that decision in favor of the plaintiff, citing that the law only protected 
those providing medical care following an accident.330 Rescue operations, such as 
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removing a patient from impending doom, was beyond the scope of medical care and, 
therefore, not protected. A succession of appellate courts upheld the ruling.331 Legal 
activists and those who desired the law to encourage helping behavior worked to have the 
law rewritten to include nonmedical rescue care. Lawmakers agreed, citing the need for 
helping behavior in an amended Statute 1799.201, passed in 2009, which reads: 
No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency 
medical or nonmedical care or assistance at the scene of an emergency 
shall be liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission other 
than an act or omission constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton 
misconduct.332 
Lawmakers codified their intent in the same law, stating, “It is the intent of the Legislature 
to encourage other individuals to volunteer, without compensation, to assist others in need 
during an emergency, while ensuring that those volunteers who provide care or assistance 
act responsibly.”333 Six other states still have laws that are more restrictive than the 
original California law. In those states, only provision of CPR and AED care is protected. 
Four other states extend Good Samaritan protections only to medical providers, not 
laypeople. 
3. Providing Legal Protections to Encourage Immediate Responder 
Assistance 
Bystanders should be encouraged to act because they provide significant benefit to 
victims, responders, and the community following an MCI. If a community wishes to foster 
this behavior, it must provide the legal protections for the potential rescuer. As the early 
literature suggests, some passive bystanders explained that they were hesitant to act 
because of the potential for litigation. More recently, surveys and focus groups studying 
why civilians did not perform CPR revealed one of the main reasons was the participants’ 
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fear of litigation if the action was performed incorrectly. Following the Chinese court’s 
ruling against citizen helper Peng Yu, the helping behavior across the country decayed. A 
culture of distrust grew, and people came to realize they could not afford to help one 
another. The negative effects of failing to protect helpers became abundantly clear in 2011 
in the Wang Yue case. In contrast, in Israel, where helping behavior is part of the culture, 
a strong Good Samaritan law not only protects immediate responders from liability but also 
ensures the government will compensate the rescuer for any damage incurred as a result of 
the rescue effort, including property or health problems. The law includes provisions to 
penalize those who do not help with a nominal monetary fine, emphasizing the society’s 
desire for citizens to help. The correlation between the level of protection provided by the 
law and the level of immediate responder action following an emergency in both countries 
suggests that helping behavior is influenced by legal protections. 
Today in the United States, every state and the District of Columbia has a version 
of the Good Samaritan law. As is typical with the patchwork of state laws, there are a 
number of variations between the laws, including who, what types of emergencies, which 
patient conditions, what rescue or medical actions, and what incident locations are 
protected.334 Though nuanced, thirty-three states have laws that protect all people 
providing aid to anyone in apparent distress. Six states have Good Samaritan laws that 
apply only to CPR and AED administration. Oklahoma protects those delivering CPR and 
AED care, as well as those “retarding the blood loss,” though no other care is included in 
the law.335 Kansas, Kentucky, and Missouri protect only trained medical providers. 
Minnesota, Vermont, and Rhode Island’s Good Samaritan laws include a duty-to-act 
provision, wherein failure to provide or summon help can result in a petty misdemeanor 
conviction, punished by a fine ranging from $100 to $500, and imprisonment up to six 
months.  
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The Good Samaritan laws are widely inconsistent across U.S. states. A person on a 
road trip would be compelled to provide assistance in Minnesota, but once that person 
drives into South Dakota, she would be protected only if she provided CPR or AED care. 
As the traveler continues and crosses into Nebraska, she would be fully covered by the 
Good Samaritan laws. But providing the same care once she travels into Kansas would be 
protected only if she were a licensed medical provider. It is unreasonable to expect citizens 
inclined to help to sort through the parameters of state laws to determine if their helping 
behavior may put them in legal jeopardy. Further, it is only fair to provide legal protections 
for immediate responders who act in good faith during an emergency. To leverage 
immediate responders during the resource-strained MCI, a consistent Good Samaritan 
protection across the country is necessary. Consideration should also be given to including 
duty-to-act parameters within the law. 
C. TRAINING 
Proper disaster preparedness always involves training and education.336 To shift 
the MCI response paradigm to include immediate responders, several training initiatives 
must be delivered. Training should be delivered to planners, professional rescuers, and 
citizens, and should be based on the revised MCI plans that include the roles and 
incorporation of immediate responders. The policy is important for establishing goals and 
expectations, but it is the education and training that will make the policy become a reality. 
There are many reasons to train bystanders to become immediate responders. Early 
studies by Russell Clark and Larry Word suggested that bystanders are dissuaded from 
intervening if they do not have a clear understanding of the emergency and what they 
should do.337 The Piliavins’s studies suggested that people do not act if they sense a 
heightened risk to them, such as the appearance of blood on the victim.338 Denner found a 
simple explanation for bystanders choosing not to help: they are embarrassed that they may 
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be seen doing the wrong thing.339 An educational program can address each of these 
elements to reassure bystanders and encourage them to act. 
Quarantelli and Stalls explain that the more the skills or knowledge bystanders have 
related to preparedness and medical care, the more likely they are to act.340 Jack Kartez 
and Michael Lindell state that formal organizations, such as law enforcement, that treat 
immediate responders as a nuisance will discourage life-saving behavior at an emergency 
and have impacts on such action in the future.341 People are more inclined to act based on 
how much they know, so accurate information dissemination is critical for immediate 
responder emergence, claim Daniel Curran and Herman Leonard.342 Bloom explains that 
people who are resilient, defined as having faced a great deal of adversity over their 
lifetimes, are more likely to act.343 Rachele Kanigel further supports this with findings 
from those who have experienced trauma through war and violence.344 
The government at all levels should create a public outreach campaign aimed at 
convincing bystanders that they should act, when safe and appropriate to do so. The 
campaign should be prolific and lasting, delivering a consistent message that will reach all 
audiences, much like the See Something, Say Something campaign. The government 
should employ professional marketing experts to ensure this promotion is delivered 
through the correct vectors with the appropriate amount of influence. The public should be 
made aware of why they are needed, where and how they can intervene, what protections 
they have, and where to seek further information. To begin this cultural shift, the pubic 
must want to help, which is why this persuasive campaign is important. 
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A comprehensive training program should be developed to educate entire 
communities on preferred immediate responder action. The public training should be 
focused on life-saving medical techniques that are common, such as treatments for external 
hemorrhage, airway compromise, chest penetrations, and hypothermia. The goal should be 
to build a more resilient public that is calm and empowered during emergencies, which 
includes considerations beyond medical care. Potential immediate responders should also 
be taught basic personal emergency preparedness, scene safety, and general principles for 
helpful behavior during emergencies. Training should also include guidance on how to 
mitigate the danger immediate responders will face due to the ongoing threat present in 
some intentional MCIs. The expectations of immediate responders should be clear, with 
definitive direction on how to best integrate and coordinate with professional responders. 
These actions should comport with the emergency plans and be compatible with the 
expectations of responders with whom the immediate responders will interface.  
Reaching the general public with an established training program is a vast 
undertaking, but it is necessary to inculcate helping behavior in a way that will agree with 
MCI plans. Israel is known for its culture of preparedness and immediate responder 
intervention. The Israeli government attributes much of this behavior to training that is 
delivered during compulsory military service, which allows the government to reach nearly 
75 percent of the population. Though there is no conscription in the United States, the K–
12 school system allows an opportunity to reach nearly 100 percent of the population 
between the ages of five and eighteen. School training would allow for universal delivery, 
regardless of socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, and other barriers that have been cited 
as obstacles to CPR education. 
Consideration should be given to modifying school curriculum to build the next 
generation of immediate responders. An approach that ensures all students receive the 
standardized training prior to graduating will deliver a generation that has been almost 
completely indoctrinated to this helping behavior. Curriculum specialists should be 
engaged to determine age-appropriate lessons that build over the course of a student’s 
academic career. Principles should include personal resilience, preparedness culture, how 
to recognize threats and emergencies, proper behavior in emergencies, cognitive behavior 
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management techniques for remaining calm and rational, and medical skills. Many students 
participate in community activities, so the importance of creating a culture of preparedness 
within the group should not be underestimated. Engaging students through the school 
curriculum allows nearly the entire population of that generation to be impacted by the 
teaching. This would be a proxy to Israel’s compulsory military service, to which the 
country’s helping culture is attributed. 
While in school, students are primed for learning, which studies have shown aids 
in comprehension and retention of material. Delivery of the training through schools has 
the added benefit of allowing the student to provide the same training to others at home, as 
seen with the CPR take-home kits. The students will be the same population that will attend 
concerts, sporting events, mass gatherings, and other events where intentional MCIs have 
been known to occur, instantly implanting immediate responders at these vulnerable 
venues. Further, if the course is required for high school graduation, it is nearly assured 
that within a few generations, the training will have reached most of the United States, 
creating a culture of preparedness and immediate responder action. 
The training should extend beyond the schools, to impact older populations and to 
provide refreshers for students following their academic careers. Disaster preparedness 
should be viewed as a lifelong effort that requires consistent and routine practice for 
optimal results. The decades of experience delivering CPR training to the public should be 
leveraged to determine the best means through which to educate the public. Methods that 
have been effective in CPR, such as train-the-trainer layperson instruction, videos, online 
instruction, and simple poster presentations, should be considered.  
In the effort to incorporate immediate responders as part of the response for MCIs, 
it is as important to train professional responders for the new paradigm. Professional 
rescuers are accustomed to working with personnel who have similar, standardized training 
and operate within a rigid command-and-control structure. They have been taught that 
bystanders can be a nuisance and obstacle, and that their removal from the scene is 
imperative for effective response—misconceptions that have been dispelled in this thesis. 
Emergency personnel should be taught about the expected behavior of immediate 
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responders, what roles each entity will play, and how to best integrate and leverage the 
resource to accomplish the broad mission objectives. 
To augment training, apply the skills, and evaluate the efficacy of plans and lessons, 
civilians should be included in MCI exercises with professional responders. Though 
immediate responders play an integral role in the response to MCIs, they are rarely included 
in formal exercises. Just as any other response agency must be included to make the 
exercise an accurate depiction of an actual event, immediate responders must take part in 
the scenario. Immediate responders, both trained and untrained, should be allowed to 
perform freely and unprompted, just as they would during an actual event. Responders 
should be given the opportunity to interface and integrate with immediate responders to 
develop and implement a coordinated response that leverages all resources. This will allow 
immediate responders and responders alike to have advance knowledge of what to 
reasonably expect from the other parties during an actual MCI response. 
D. SUMMARY 
Bystanders can and will become immediate responders following an MCI. As 
agencies aspire to leverage this resource, they should consider how to best prepare the 
system and the potential immediate responders in advance of an MCI. The lessons learned 
from nearly seventy years of public CPR education and outreach in the United States can 
provide guidance on how to engage the public to act during emergencies. The current Good 
Samaritan protections provided vary by state and often do not protect the type of action 
that would be required of immediate responders following an MCI. Such laws should be 
standardized and bolstered to encourage immediate responder action. A comprehensive 
training program, delivered primarily through the K–12 curriculum but also through 
community events, can create an entire generation that is prepared to serve in the critical 
immediate responder role. Several recommendations are made in the next chapter to 
support the development of this culture, as well as to provide structures and systems that 
plan for, and provide management of, immediate responder action following an MCI. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
As shown in this thesis, bystanders can and will emerge following an MCI, 
becoming immediate responders. The immediate responders will evacuate, treat, and 
transport themselves and one another to hospitals. They offer immediate assistance during 
a time-critical period and become a force multiplier for limited emergency resources. 
However, they can also cause unintended consequences, such as overcrowding hospitals 
and contributing to scene disorder. Communities should incorporate immediate responder 
emergence into their MCI plans and develop the support structures to drive this resource 
to be most successful. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policymakers, emergency response leaders, health care leaders, community 
members, and researchers can contribute to the development and maintenance of a helping 
culture. Together, society can prepare immediate responders prior to an event and provide 
management of this critical resource during an MCI. The following recommendations are 
made to encourage helping behavior and incorporate the behavior into MCI response. 
1. Deploy EMS Response to Hospitals to Redistribute Patients 
Immediate responder emergence is a common occurrence during intentional MCIs. 
The impacts beyond the scene are nearly immediate and have severe consequences for the 
health care system, such as over-convergence on the closest hospital, poor triaging of 
patients, little to no treatment delivered prior to hospital arrival, and patients delivered to 
community hospitals when they need specialty centers. Emergency plans should therefore 
include procedures for mitigating these unintended consequences. 
Emergency responders should engage the public as early as possible to direct their 
transportation efforts. Once on scene, personnel should be assigned to interface with 
immediate responders before they leave the scene. Professional responders will be able to 
identify the patients that must be immediately transferred to an EMS asset. For the less 
severe patients that will be transported by immediate responders, a professional responder 
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should assign the driver to a specific hospital in accordance with a coordinated patient 
distribution plan, and provide hospitals with advanced notification. Using emergency alert 
push notifications, mapping tools, radio, and other broadcast means, incident managers can 
also reach those who have already left the scene, providing the same direction to minimize 
over-convergence on a single hospital. 
During this initial period of chaos, however, it is unlikely that emergency 
responders will be able to effectively coordinate or direct immediate responders. Therefore, 
public safety resources should view the location of the patients, not the location of the 
incident, as the MCI scene. As patients are shifted from the scene to the hospital, this 
usually creates a secondary MCI at the hospital site. Immediate responders often transport 
patients prior to arrival of EMS units, and certainly before the EMS units can balance the 
resources with the demand. To address this, in addition to those units sent to the scene, a 
cadre of emergency response assets should be routed to the closest hospital as soon as the 
911 center is notified of the MCI. This would include transport assets, manpower, and MCI 
vehicles equipped with caches of equipment and supplies. This will allow personnel who 
are trained in field operations to address the MCI that emerges at the local hospital. This is 
the location where public safety can gain control of patient flow, thereby reducing 
morbidity and mortality. 
At the hospital, EMS personnel will take on much of the same role they would at 
the scene according to traditional response plans. They will remove patients from vehicles, 
conduct triage, and provide immediate assistance to those who need it. Working with the 
local hospital, as well as the broader health care system, the EMS units will redistribute 
patients to surrounding facilities. This will take into account the bed and staff availability 
of each facility, as well as patient conditions and needs for specialty services. While 
maintaining compliance with the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA) disaster provisions, patients of low acuity should be transported to alternate 
care sites. Ambulances, vans, and buses staffed with medical professionals should move 
patients to urgent care centers, or to hospitals outside of the area already receiving MCI 
patients, as portrayed in Figure 2. This approach will allow for proper stabilization of 
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patients and even and appropriate distribution throughout the health care system, and will 
prevent the local hospital from having to absorb the bulk of the patients. 
 
Patients will likely overwhelm the closest hospital, delivered by immediate responders by private car, 
police car, walking, or other means. EMS and the health care system must work together to redistribute 
patients across the broader health care spectrum using a variety of transport mechanisms, including 
ambulances, medical ambulance buses, mass transit and school buses, and vans. 
Figure 2. Recommended Plan for Redistribution of Patients from Closest 
Hospital 
2. Apply Management Frameworks Compatible with Modern MCIs 
MCIs produce qualitative challenges that make the concepts of ICS and NIMS, 
which are used for routine events, incompatible in the immediate aftermath of the event. 
The rigid, bureaucratic structure of these plans cannot be successfully applied, and valuable 
incident management resources are consumed in attempts to force these models to function. 
A management framework that, unlike ICS and NIMS, acknowledges a period of chaos 
should be developed to better support MCI response operations. 
106 
Command and control, long embraced by emergency services, should be 
abandoned in favor of analysis and adaptability. Plans and management structures should 
allow for flexibility to the dynamic conditions and demands of an MCI. The plan should 
encourage commanders to work through this initial chaos, allowing the emergence and 
seemingly uncoordinated response to take place. Emphasis should be placed on 
understanding complexity, sensemaking, and emergence, all characteristics that define an 
MCI response. 
The plan should not direct specific tactics but instead call out broad strategies. 
Commanders should use this plan to manipulate variables and guide the incident toward 
resolution. Incident management should follow through the domains of the Cynefin 
framework rather than forcing a predefined organization chart with strictly defined duties 
upon responders. The plan should call for applying traditional ICS and NIMS structures 
only once the environment is conducive to them. 
3. Develop Incident Commanders’ Capabilities to Address Modern 
MCIs 
Incident commanders have been taught that ICS and NIMS should be applied to 
every incident. Since the novelty and complexity of an MCI are incompatible with these 
structures, new approaches must be taken to manage and eventually control these incidents. 
To allow for that, an educational curriculum should be developed to provide incident 
commanders with the skills and knowledge they need to lead in a highly chaotic, complex, 
and dynamic environment. 
First and foremost, the curriculum should educate commanders on the 
characteristics, demands, and social dynamics of an MCI that make their traditional 
approach inapplicable. Myths about bystander inaction should be dispelled and students 
provided with an understanding of actual human behavior in the aftermath of an MCI. 
These attributes should be used to illustrate complexity theory, providing an understanding 
of the cues and indicators of the specific domains of the Cynefin framework. Students 
should be able to use sensemaking tools to analyze the incident’s components and 
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understand not only into which domain they fall but also how to operate in that environment 
for successful incident management. 
Most importantly, the incident commander should be taught to let go of many of 
the tenets that have been reiterated throughout their careers. In the MCI environment, the 
typical approaches do not apply, and incident commanders must be able to think their way 
through the many confounding factors. Commanders should be taught to be comfortable 
operating in chaos, and must understand that poor coordination in the early phases is to be 
expected and does not render a response ineffective.  
The curriculum should include techniques for guiding behavior, rather than 
commanding it, as public safety will not govern all components operating in the response. 
Incident commanders should be taught to integrate disparate resources to achieve common 
goals. Using broad strategic goals, the commander can orchestrate the numerous 
components and connections within the complex response to efficiently and effectively 
leverage each, including immediate responders, to accomplish the mission. 
4. Deliver Training to Civilians to Encourage Helping Behavior 
As the paradigm shifts to recognize and manage immediate responder behavior 
following MCIs, training must be delivered to civilians to turn disaster planning into a 
reality. A concerted educational campaign that encourages preferred actions should be 
developed to train civilians. The training should be focused on basic trauma care for life-
threatening injuries, to include external hemorrhage, airway compromise, chest 
penetrations, and hypothermia. The course should also include basic emergency 
preparedness, general principles of helpful and safe behavior following an MCI, and how 
to best integrate and coordinate with professional responders. The lessons learned through 
decades of public CPR instruction should be incorporated into the training approach. 
To reach a broad swath of the community and thereby inculcate the helping 
behavior as early as possible, this training would best be included in the K–12 curriculum 
in U.S. schools. This will allow the standardized training to be delivered to most of the 
population between that ages of five and eighteen, developing a generation that has been 
indoctrinated into this helping behavior. Throughout the students’ academic careers, they 
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should be taught progressively more comprehensive disaster skills, including personal 
resilience, preparedness culture, how to recognize threats and emergencies, proper 
behavior in emergencies, cognitive behavior management techniques for remaining calm 
and rational, and medical skills.  
The training should be complemented with a public outreach campaign that 
encourages bystanders to act and to seek the training. Marketing should be similar to the 
See Something, Say Something campaign. Civilians should understand that they are 
needed, how they can intervene, what protections they have, and where they can receive 
training. The outreach and training must also include instruction that addresses when 
civilians should not intervene, such as if they are not already on the scene, or when there 
is a hazard that would endanger the immediate responder. 
5. Develop Stronger, More Consistent Good Samaritan Protections 
All U.S. states currently have some form of Good Samaritan law. However, six 
only protect for CPR and AED use, and four protect only medical providers. To encourage 
the public to act during times of emergency, and to foster a culture of helping behavior, 
Good Samaritan laws should be bolstered and standardized. The laws and protections 
should not vary between states; they should unanimously protect civilians from civil 
liability if the immediate responder is acting in good faith, under emergency conditions, 
without compensation, provided there is no gross negligence or willful or wanton 
misconduct. The coverage should apply to all emergency actions, including medical care 
for traumatic injuries and moving patients out of harm’s way, if necessary.  
Consideration should be given to include a duty to act, with nominal penalties 
applied to those who bypass an emergency without at least notifying professional rescuers. 
A federal law should be established to provide this protection. However, most civil 
litigation occurs at the state level, so a strategic means of standardizing these laws should 
be developed. Policymakers may consider requiring a state to create a Good Samaritan law 
that includes the desired language and parameters for that state to be eligible for federal 
grant funding or to receive support for the development of immediate responders. 
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6. Conduct Further Research 
a. Research Limitations 
This research presented in this thesis is subject to several limitations. The cases 
highlighted were meant to provide illustrations of the trends observed in immediate 
responder behavior. Therefore, the sample size was small and statistically insignificant. 
Based on this research, it is impossible to determine if this behavior is guaranteed in every 
event, or what percentage of bystanders become immediate responders. 
Official, government-sanctioned after-action reports were limited to specific 
disciplines and usually did not expand to any roles and functions outside the domain of a 
single department. To capture the comprehensive effects across all agencies and the health 
care system, reputable media reports and academic research was the primary source of 
information. It is unclear if the authority carried by government-sanctioned reports would 
lend more credibility to the facts presented in the case examples. 
There is minimal previous research regarding immediate responders following an 
intentional MCI. As such, there is limited empirical evidence about the behavior and 
impacts of immediate responders during an intentional MCI versus a natural or accidental 
one. The limited sociological studies regarding antagonistic MCIs led to some reliance on 
evidence from MCIs in general rather than violent MCIs specifically. It is an assumption 
that some or all of this behavior included in the general MCI research is to be reasonably 
expected in MCIs caused by violence, as was observed in the case examples. 
The nature of immediate responders, as has been explained, is that they emerge and 
dissipate without formality. Rarely is it possible to follow up with immediate responders, 
as their identity remains anonymous. Accounts of immediate responder action are therefore 
limited to the few immediate responders that can be accurately identified, as well as 
eyewitness accounts. It is difficult to fully understand psychological and sociological 
motivations behind such action without the ability to follow up with the immediate 
responders. 
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b. Further Research Recommendations 
As the disaster sociology literature has expanded, there remain weaknesses and 
gaps in the research. Much of the work regarding disaster emergence has referred to groups 
that responded late in the response phase or, more so, in the recovery phase. There is 
minimal literature regarding the individuals and groups that respond immediately after a 
disaster occurs, such as immediate responders following MCIs, and the operational impacts 
on emergency response operations. Much attention has been given to search and rescue, 
particularly after natural and technological disaster. These events can be similar to 
intentional MCIs in that they provide no notice, produce an overwhelming number of 
patients, impact a wide geographic area, and include impediments to rescuers making it to 
the scene. Nonetheless, there remains little work devoted solely to the unique challenge of 
intentional MCIs. John Twigg and Irina Mosel also point to a narrow scope of case studies, 
stating, “Very little is known about the nature and forms of urban disaster emergence in 
long-running crises, or in urban settings where there are governance failures, conflict 
(political, social, ethnic), violence and criminality.”345 Further, while immediate responder 
emergence is a recognized phenomenon, it is still unknown what proportion of bystanders 
do become active, which is fundamental to understanding how to increase this helping 
behavior. Finally, in comparison to the volumes of work concerning group disaster 
behavior between 1950 and 2000, there has been minimal novel or updated research in the 
past twenty years. 
Researchers should continue to study immediate responder emergence and broader 
psychological and sociological motivations and impacts of disasters. The inaccurate 
stereotypes regarding bystander inaction were developed by psychologists many decades 
ago. A new body of literature should review contemporary emergency incidents and 
determine if the previous findings still apply. Immediate responder emergence, at least to 
the point that it impacts the overall incident response, appears to be more prevalent today. 
The literature should identify if helping behavior has actually increased, or if the 
appearance is an artifact of media access and proliferation. Researchers should also identify 
 
345 Twigg and Mosel, “Emergent Groups and Spontaneous Volunteers in Urban Disaster Response.” 
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the proportion of bystanders that act and suggest means to motivate the remaining portion 
to contribute. 
There is little literature regarding intentional MCIs and the unique challenges they 
cause, including how they change bystander behavior. It is implied that the studies that 
have been conducted regarding natural and technological disasters are applicable to all 
MCIs. However, many of the constructs of those types of disasters differ from intentional 
MCIs. As these intentional events continue to grow in frequency and magnitude, research 
should be conducted on how to best respond to the unique circumstances, including 
bystander behavior. The new studies should concentrate on intentional MCIs, particularly 
those that occur in urban settings; involve complex attacks; include political, social, or 
ethnic motivations; and are caused by violence. These characteristics are underrepresented 
in the existing literature. 
Immediate responder emergence during MCIs is a unique behavior, the nature and 
impact of which is rarely understood in retrospect. As immediate responders fade back into 
the community, it is difficult to later reconstruct the event and reach those who acted. It is 
also nearly impossible for researchers to fully comprehend the intense emotional and social 
dynamics of an emergency incident by merely reviewing incident and witness reports. It is 
recommended that a team of researchers deploy to incidents to observe the setting, 
behavior, and response operations firsthand. Being immersed in the environment of the 
edge of chaos during which this behavior occurs will allow researchers to better understand 
the behavior and motivations. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Many of the assumptions that drive MCI response plans are predicated upon the 
belief that bystanders will remain passive. These assumptions include disaster syndrome, 
panic, and social breakdown. Recent events, however, have disproven these assumptions. 
Bystanders have been shown to take an active role in helping themselves and each other, 
becoming what has been termed immediate responders. They play a critical role in filling 
the immediate gap between when the onset of the emergency and when professional 
rescuers arrive. They have been shown to lead evacuations, provide treatment, and 
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transport patients to definitive care. When the demand outpaces resources, these immediate 
responders continue to be integral to the success of the MCI response, serving as a force 
multiplier for the strained response resources. 
1. The Critical Role of the First Responder 
Immediate responders are particularly important following intentional MCIs. The 
life-threatening injuries caused by shootings, stabbings, explosions, and vehicle rammings 
demand immediate treatment if the victim is to survive. With potential secondary or 
ongoing attacks, timely evacuation is critical, which requires the help of civilians before 
and after professional responders can arrive, especially for those who are immobilized by 
their injuries. The delays in professional responders reaching the scene following 
intentional MCIs, caused by elements such as large geographic areas, ongoing threats of 
violence, and interception by patients while responding, make immediate responder action 
important. Finally, immediate responders provide quick and effective transport of victims 
to local hospitals, preempting or augmenting an EMS system that is already overwhelmed 
by the demand. 
Recent intentional MCIs have shown that, without prompting, bystanders can and 
will emerge as a meaningful response force immediately following a disaster. In the cases 
of the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center attack, 2004 Madrid train bombings, 2013 
Boston Marathon bombings, 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting, and 2017 Las Vegas Route 
91 Harvest Festival shooting, immediate responders treated, evacuated, and transported 
victims. Individuals acted independently and as groups to emerge as effective rescuers. 
This occurred before professional rescuers arrived, and continued thereafter until the on-
scene demand and resources stabilized. In each of these incidents, immediate responders 
transported more patients than traditional EMS ambulances, and EMS and physicians alike 
credited the quick action of these empowered bystanders with saving lives. 
2. Challenges of Immediate Responder Action 
Along with the positive impacts of immediate responders, their actions have caused 
inadvertent challenges following MCIs. Without medical training, they often inaccurately 
triage patients. This leads to misdirection of efforts toward unsalvageable victims or 
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patients with minor injuries while others would who benefit more from the assistance are 
left untreated. The immediate responders usually view transportation to the hospital as the 
desired outcome, so they quickly deliver patients to the closest hospital. This overwhelms 
the local hospital and does not leverage the entire health care system. Further, it does not 
direct patients to specialty centers, which may be necessary for the types of injuries 
sustained in the MCI. The civilian transports challenge hospitals by delivering patients 
without prior notification, and with little or no prehospital care and stabilization provided. 
Due to the poor scene triage and the ability to self-transport, many patients of low acuity 
are the first to arrive. This leads hospitals to incorrectly believe these minor injuries are the 
worst of the injuries to be expected, and these patients with minor injuries absorb the 
limited resources prior to the arrival of the more serious patients. 
3. Managing Immediate Responders at the MCI Scene 
To leverage the immediate responders, and counter the challenges this type of 
response causes, incident commanders must manage this resource. Immediate responders 
do not fall within the realm of control of the incident commander, unlike professional 
response assets. This contradicts the constructs used in traditional command-and-control 
incident management. But immediate responders are only one portion of violent MCIs that 
introduce complexity that is incompatible with the tools used for routine emergency 
management. The rigid bureaucracy involved in traditional incident command does not 
function in the modern, complex MCI, especially those that are caused intentionally and 
involve immediate responders. Effective management and optimum resolution of these 
types of events demand a new method of incident leadership. 
Rather than trying to overlay the structures of ICS to force a sense of order, the 
incident commander should understand the complexity and the subsequent chaos, and 
should learn to operate within that environment. To do so, the incident commander will 
need to understand the basic tenets of complexity theory, be capable of performing accurate 
and ongoing sensemaking, and know how to operate on the edge of chaos. Rather than 
commanding in the traditional sense, the incident commander will use new skills and 
knowledge to coordinate the various components and relationships within the complex 
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system, leading the event to resolution. One such sensemaking tool, the Cynefin 
framework, can be useful in differentiating which components can and should be directed 
and which should be allowed to emerge organically. By applying this framework 
thoroughly and continuously, the incident commander will be prompted to act in ways that 
are best suited for the particular domain in which the incident and its components are 
situated at the time. 
4. Cultivating and Managing a Helpful Culture 
Bystanders have repeatedly transformed into immediate responders following 
recent MCIs. The advantages and disadvantages of this action have been consistent and 
predictable. As the frequency of intentional MCIs increases, the emergence of immediate 
responders will likely increase as well. In response to an incident that demands immediate 
assistance to victims and vastly overwhelms the health care system designed to treat them, 
the extra help should be encouraged. Therefore, the community should foster a culture of 
helping behavior and healthy disaster response. Based on decades of inculcating bystander 
CPR, the government should endeavor to train civilians to become immediate responders. 
Training should include personal resilience, disaster preparedness, scene safety, trauma 
care, general principles for treatment and transport, and how to most effectively integrate 
with professional responders. Good Samaritan laws should be bolstered and standardized 
to provide protections that encourage immediate response. 
In response to the incident itself, incident commanders must apply their new 
knowledge and skills to orchestrate all available resources, including immediate 
responders. To counter the unintended consequences of immediate responder patient 
transport, public safety should position response assets at the closest hospital to manage 
the secondary MCI, the influx of patients at the facility. These crews will perform triage 
and prehospital treatment, move critical patients into the hospital, and redistribute 
noncritical patients throughout the health care system. Finally, further research should be 
conducted to better understand immediate responders during intentional MCIs. Better 
understanding of this behavior, including the psychological and sociological motivations, 
will allow for better management and leverage of this valuable resource. 
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